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A.  The Importance of the Rulings Commented in the Framework of the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal Order 
 
For the first time, national provisions governing the quantification of respective 
compensation amounts due for public purposes expropriation and for unlawful 
expropriation1 were declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court’s 
decisions No. 348 and 349, issued on 24 October 2007,2 because they were in 
contrast with the international obligations stated in Protocol 1 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter the “ECvHR”), Article 1. 
 
After these decisions were drawn, the relationship between European Courts on the 
protection of fundamental rights has undergone a significant evolution.  Not only 
has the Italian Constitutional Court clarified, through Article 117 paragraph 1 of the 
Italian Constitution,3 the European Convention’s actual efficacy in the domestic 
legal system, but it has interpreted international obligations as an interposed 
standard of review, on the basis of which the constitutionality of domestic law must 
be assessed. 
                                            
∗ The writing of this essay was divided between the authors but the end result is a joint whole. The 
authors are also jointly responsible for any errors. In particular, Francesca Biondi Dal Monte 
(francesca.biondi@unife.it), Ph.D Candidate in Constitutional Law at the University of Ferrara, wrote 
paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9; Filippo Fontanelli (f.fontanelli@sssup.it), Ph.D Candidate in Individual 
person and legal protections at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 
LLP, wrote paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11.  We would like to thank Giuseppe Martinico for his precious 
assistance.  All translations from an original Italian text (including the decisions commented) are ours.  
The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 By this term we mean the phenomenon of acquisition by right of occupancy (occupazione acquisitiva), 
which occurs when the State gets the property of an expropriated land, not in force of a proper 
expropriation order, but by building public facilities on it. 
2 All the decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court are available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
3 As amended by the constitutional law No. 3 of 2001. 
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The Constitutional Court tackled a delicate issue: on one hand it had to prevent the 
sanctions, inevitable at the time, that the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter, the “ECtHR”) would inflict on Italy if the domestic legislation on 
expropriation were not to change, on the other hand it wanted to prevent another 
trend, that of the potential shift of the primary forum for individuals’ claims from 
the national to the international jurisdiction.4 
 
In the last years, the ECtHR has often condemned and asked Italy to remove any 
(normative) obstacle that prevented dispossessed owners from receiving a 
reasonable compensation in relation to the market value of the land expropriated.5  
The Strasbourg Court, indeed, because of the guilty inactivity of the Italian 
legislator, had already started to admit actions brought by Italian citizens although 
they had not previously exhausted the domestic legal proceedings available:6 by 
doing this, the Court implicitly condemned the Italian remedies, since, in its view, 
the Italian regulation as a whole did not comply with the ECvHR’s requirements, 
and therefore the ineffectiveness of the remedies offered made Article 35 of the 
Convention inapplicable.7 
                                            
4 See the report compiled by the Italian House of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) on the web site 
http://www.camera.it/europ_rap_int/14489/20513/14494/documentotesto.asp (2007) and 
http://www.camera.it/ europ_rap_int/14489/20513/14495/documentotesto.asp (2006) where the 
sanctions inflicted to Italy by the Court of Strasbourg in the last two years are referred to. 
5 See Scordino v. Italy, May 29, 2006.  For a careful overview of the ECtHR’s case-law on this issue (and in 
particular of the decision Jahn and Others v. Germany, No. 46720/99; 72203/01; 72552/01), and for a 
description of the effects of this jurisprudence in Germany see U. Deutsche, Expropriation without 
Compensation – the European Court of Human Rights sanctions German Legislation expropriating the Heirs of 
“New Farmers”, 6 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1367 (2005). 
6 As requested instead under Article 35, para. 1, of the ECvHR. 
7 Artcile 35, paragraph 1 reads: “The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies 
have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a 
period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”  The domestic remedy, 
however, needs to be effective, see Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, from the ECtHR Key case-law issues 
series, available at the Court’s website (http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E3FC0C7E-BD11-479F-
B069-C300449B7ECF/0/COURT_n1295989_v2_Key_caselaw_issues__Art_35_para_1_Exhaustion_ 
of_domestic_remedies2.pdf), § 10: “In determining whether any particular remedy meets the criteria of 
availability and effectiveness, regard must be had to the particular circumstances of the individual case. 
Account must be taken not only of formal remedies available, but also of the general legal and political 
context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant (Van Oosterwijck v. 
Belgium, judgment of 6 November 1980, §§ 36-40; Akdivar v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, §§ 
68-69; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, judgment of 24 February 2005, §§ 116-117; Isayeva and Others v. 
Russia, judgment of 24 February 2005, §§ 152-153).”  In addition, see A. Guazzarotti, La CEDU e 
l’ordinamento nazionale: tendenze giurisprudenziale e nuove esigenze teoretiche, XXVI QUAD. COST. 497 (2006).  
The Author here mentions, among others, the cases Scozzari and others, No. 67790/01; Serrilli, No. 
77822/01; Binotti No. 2, No. 71603/01. 
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In addition to that, the decisions discussed here eventually examined the 
“disapplication” phenomenon; specifically, its occurrence in conflicts between 
domestic law and the ECvHR.  Some judges had already started applying this 
method, which comes from the judicial practice of disapplying the internal 
statutory norm conflicting with Community law.  In some recent occasions, even 
the Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione) and the Supreme 
Administrative Court (Consiglio di Stato) had endorsed the use of disapplication in 
cases of conflict with ECvHR law. 
 
With regard to the single referrals, the Constitutional Court in decision No. 348 
stated the unconstitutionality of Article 5-bis, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Law 
Decree (decreto legge) No. 333 of July 11, 1992, converted into law (in an amended 
version) by Law No. 359 of August 8, 1992, concerning the criteria for calculating 
compensation in case of expropriation for public purposes,8 and the application of 
these calculation criteria to pending cases, following the entry into force of Law No. 
359 of 1992.9 
 
Instead, Article 5-bis, paragraph 7-bis, of the said July 8, 1992, Law Decree No. 333, 
which set the criteria of compensation for unlawful expropriation,10 was declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court’s No. 349 decision.  
 
In particular, the Italian regulations challenged were in conflict with Article 117, 
paragraph 1 of the Constitution, in relation with the European Convention’s First 
Protocol, Article 1, because they did not provide significant compensation in case of 
unlawful expropriation and expropriation for public purposes.11  The 
abovementioned criteria set to calculate the compensation, indeed, represented an 
infringement of the basic property right, thus, being in conflict with the 
Conventional norms that protect it. 
                                            
8 The sum obtained is based on the average between the market value and the reappraised rental income 
(reddito dominicale rivalutato). 
9 This constitutional plea was introduced incidentally (in via incidentale) before the Constitutional Court 
through three separate referral orders issued by the Supreme Court of Cassation: one on May 29, 2006, 
and two on October 19, 2006, respectively registered in the 2006 orders’ register at No. 402 and 681, and 
in the 2007 orders’ register No. 2. 
10 This constitutional question was pledged before the Court with the referral orders issued by the 
Supreme Court dated May 20, 2006, and by the Palermo Court of Appeal on June 29, 2006, respectively 
registered in the orders’ 2006 register of the Court at No. 401 and 557. 
11 As for expropriation for public purposes, the conflict arises only when the public interest pursued is 
not of a fundamental nature. 
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Moreover, the judges challenged the domestic discipline on the grounds of its 
contrast with Article 111, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Constitution, and with its 
interpretation based on Article 6 of the European Convention.  These norms, 
indeed, provide for the application to pending cases of the new unfavorable 
compensation’s calculation criteria in case of both unlawful expropriation and 
expropriation for public purposes, therefore, they violate the rules of due process, 
namely the principle of equality of arms.  As a result, the legislator’s intervention in 
the field of justice administration causes damage to the plaintiffs, since it aims at 
regulating a particular and circumscribed set of disputes’ outcomes. 
 
The grounds of the two judgments are virtually undistinguishable, therefore, unless 
otherwise specified, we will refer to them as one single decision.12 
 
B.  The ECtHR Case-Law on Lawful and Unlawful Expropriation:  The 
Divergence With the Italian Constitutional Case-Law 
 
Before analyzing the merit of the unconstitutionality decisions, it is necessary to 
outline the normative and judicial framework they are rooted in, which is either 
implicitly or expressly referred to.  The orders, invoking the Article 111 and 117 
standards, were declared non-manifestly inadmissible because of the potential 
violation of ECvHR’s Article 6 and ECvHR’s Protocol No. 1, Article 1, as 
interpreted by the ECtHR. 
 
With regard to lawful expropriation, the referring judges recalled the July 29, 2004 
ECtHR’s decision (Scordino v. Italy).  In this decision, the Strasbourg Court censored 
Italy’s conduct, namely the application of said Article 5-bis to ongoing trials; such 
retroactive effect of the provision was prejudicial both to the clarity and certainty of 
the normative discipline governing dispossessing practices, and to the property 
rights of dispossessed individuals.  Indeed, the application to ongoing disputes of 
the criterion set by Article 5-bis violated the expectations of expropriated 
individuals who had filed a claim with a tribunal in order to get a compensation 
calculated upon the goods’ market value, as pursuant to June 25, 1865 Law, No. 
2359, Article 39, regulating expropriation for public purposes.  This statute was put 
back into force after another set of norms, that provided for a compensation 
equaling the agricultural/rural value of the land were declared unconstitutional. 
 
                                            
12 Two different judges wrote the two decisions.  Justice Gaetano Silvestri wrote decision No. 348, 
whereas justice Giuseppe Tesauro wrote decision No. 349. 
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The ECtHR’s decision, dated March 29, 2006, instead, ascertained the systematic 
violation of Protocol No. 1 Article 1 perpetrated by Italy, and stated that the 
constant use of compensation’s quantification criteria that unreasonably 
disregarded the actual goods’ market value had determined, as said, a structural 
situation of violation of human rights.13  Furthermore, the Strasbourg Court 
highlighted that Italy, under Article 46 of the Convention, had an obligation to put 
such a situation to an end, through the adoption of suitable legislative, 
administrative, and economic measures. 
 
In the European Court’s view, in fact, the interference with the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions must strike a “fair balance” between the community’s 
general interest demands and the individual’s fundamental rights protection 
requirements.14  The Court claims that: “the concern to achieve this balance is 
reflected in the structure of Article 1 as a whole, including, therefore, the second 
sentence, which is to be read in the light of the general principle enunciated in the 
first sentence.  In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized by 
any measure applied by the State, including measures depriving a person of his 
possessions.”15 
 
In determining whether this requirement is met, the Court acknowledges that the 
State enjoys a wide extent of discretionary powers on both choosing the means of 
enforcement and ascertaining whether the consequences are justified in the general 
interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question.16 
 
Moreover, according to Protocol 1, Article 1, the right to full compensation is not 
always guaranteed.  Although in many cases of lawful expropriation only full 
compensation in relation to the property value can be regarded to as reasonable  
(for instance in case of land expropriation for the purpose of building a road or for 
                                            
13 See Scordino 2006, § 82: “Having regard to the margin of appreciation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 allows 
national authorities to choose the opportune balance; the Court considers that the price paid to the applicants did 
not bear a reasonable relation to the value of the expropriated property (see Papachelas v. Greece [GC], no. 
31423/96, § 49, and Platakou v. Greece, no. 38460/97, § 54). It follows that the fair balance was upset.”  On the 
Scordino case, see also S. Mirate, Scordino ultimo atto: la Corte europea torna a “condannare” l’occupazione 
acquisitiva e indennizza al valore attuale il terreno occupato, in 88 RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE E PREVIDENZA, 2007, 
1053 and ff. 
14 See Lönnroth v. Sweden, No. 7151/75; 7152/75 § 69. 
15 See Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, No. 17849/91, § 38; The former King of Greece 
and Others v. Greece [GC], No. 25701/94, §§ 89-90. 
16 See Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], No. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 75. 
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other purposes related to the “the public interest”), this rule is subject to some 
exceptions.17 
 
Indeed, legitimate objects pursued in the “public interest,” such as those pursued 
through economic reform measures or through measures designed to achieve 
greater social justice, may call for less than the reimbursement of the full market 
value.  For example, in the case of James and Others v. The United Kingdom18 the issue 
was whether, in the context of the leasehold-reform legislation, the conditions that 
empowered long-term leasehold tenants to acquire their property struck the fair 
balance.  The European Court found that they did, holding that the context was one 
of social and economic reform in which the burden borne by the freeholders was 
not unreasonable, even though the amount received by the plaintiffs was less than 
the property’s full market value.19 
 
On the contrary, the Italian norms governing compensation in case of expropriation 
for public purposes had already undergone the constitutionality test before the 
Constitutional Court several times, and they had been declared consistent with 
Article 42, paragraph 3, of the Constitution, since they introduced a well-thought 
criterion, which guaranteed a “non ridicule” indemnity to the expropriated 
individuals.  In this sense, the provisions duly suited the property’s social function 
in the Italian legal order (see decision No. 283/1993, order No. 414/1993, decision 
No. 442/1993). 
 
                                            
17 See James and Others v. The United Kingdom, No. 8793/79, § 54, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], No. 31443/96, 
§ 182, The Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC] (just satisfaction), No. 25701/94, § 78. 
18  Chassagnou, supra note 16. 
19 The Court has held that less than full compensation may also be necessary, a fortiori, where property is 
taken for the purposes of “such fundamental changes of a country’s constitutional system as the 
transition from monarchy to republic.”  See The Former King of Greece, cited above, § 89.  The Court has 
gone over this principle again in the case of Broniowski v. Poland, in the context of the country’s transition 
towards a democratic regime, and has specified that rules regulating ownership relations within the 
country “involving a wide-reaching but controversial legislative scheme with significant economic 
impact for the country as a whole” could involve decisions restricting compensation for the taking or 
restitution of property to a level below its market value.  The Court has also reiterated these principles 
regarding the law’s enactment in “the exceptional context of German reunification.”  See Von Maltzan 
and Others v. Germany (dec.) [GC], nos. 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02, §§ 77 and 111-12.  In the 
Papachelas v. Greece case ([GC], No. 31423/96), in which the issue concerned more than 150 properties’ 
expropriation, including part of the applicants’ property, for the purpose of building a major road, the 
Court held that the compensation awarded to the applicants had not upset the fair balance between 
opposing interests as it was just slightly lower than the certified value of the land. 
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As for the application to ongoing trials, the Court had rejected the claims of 
unconstitutionality, since outside the sector of criminal law the general principle of 
non-retroactivity is of a non-constitutional nature.20 
 
Even the referrals questioning the constitutionality of unlawful expropriation made 
reference to the ECtHR’s case law on Protocol 1, Article 1, and to its evolution 
towards a stronger protection of property rights. 
 
In the ECtHR’s view, indeed, the Italian practice violated the property right, since it 
was deprived of a legal basis, and, therefore, made it impossible to foresee the legal 
outcome of an unlawful expropriation procedure.21  Among the reasons for stating 
the incompatibility, the European Court listed the criterion used to quantify the 
compensation, maintaining that the reduced amount obtained following that 
criterion set a further advantage for the Public Administration accountable for the 
unlawful conduct.  In other words, the State would be waived from paying a 
significant part of the due indemnity, and this could lead to misbehaviours and 
episodes of unlawful conduct by the Public Administration. 
 
Moreover, the Court stated that, by setting an unlawful expropriation 
compensation, which was only slightly higher than the compensation provided in 
case of lawful expropriation, the discipline could lead to a violation of the property 
right protected by the Convention.22 
 
On the domestic side, again, the Constitutional Court had already intervened on 
the matter, and had stated the unconstitutionality of Article 5-bis, paragraph 6, for 
violating Article 3, 28, 42, paragraph 2, and 97 of the Constitution.  The provision 
was unconstitutional in setting the compensation criteria for unlawful 
expropriation in appliance of the same criteria set by the public purposes’ lawful 
expropriation’s discipline. 
 
Indeed, in the case of unlawful expropriation, the public interest is satisfied by the 
non-restitution of the good seized, followed by the transfer to the State of both its 
property and the property of the public buildings on it.  Under the principle of 
                                            
20 On the divergences existing between Italian constitutional case–law and the Court of Strasbourg’s 
jurisprudence see F. Scoca, Indennità di espropriazione: la diversa sensibilità della Consulta e della Corte di 
Strasburgo, available at: www.federalismi.it, May 31, 2006. 
21 See Belvedere-Alberghiera v. Italia, No. 31524/96, Colazzo e Serrao v. Italia, No. 63633/00, Sciarrotta v. 
Italia, No. 14793/02; Immobiliare Cerro S.A.S. v. Italia, No. 35638/03). 
22 See among others, Immobiliare Cerro No. 35638/03, Scordino v. Italy No. 3, No. 43662/98, Pasculli v. Italy, 
No. 36818/97. 
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reasonableness, the equalization of the compensation criteria is excessively 
favourable to the public interest making it unsuitable since it alters the balance 
struck between conflicting public and private interests (see decision No. 369/1996). 
 
However, the following legislator’s intervention had only slightly increased the 
amount due for compensation (Article 3, paragraph 65 of Law No. 662 of 1996) that, 
nevertheless, continued to be far lower than the actual market value.  This norm 
applied retroactively as well, and affected all the ongoing trials in which 
individuals had filed a claim for compensation. 
 
Several issues of constitutionality had been raised since then, but all of them were 
rejected: the Court has repeatedly maintained that if a public interest backs the 
unlawful expropriation procedure, there is no constitutional obligation that 
guarantees full compensation of the damages suffered, or that excludes the trials in 
course from the re-calculation of the compensation (see decisions No. 148/1999; 
396/1999 and 24/2000, and orders No. 251/2000 and 158/2002). 
 
Bearing these facts in mind, the referring judges challenged the provisions on the 
basis of the different standard of review of Article 111 and 117, paragraph 1, of the 
Constitution.  They introduced a new perspective, alleging the challenged norm’s 
supervened conflict23 both with the principle of fair trial and with the international 
obligations adhered to by Italy, in reference to the ECvHR’s Article 6 of and to the 
ECvHR’s Protocol Number 1, Article 1, working as interposed standards.  
 
C.  The Reasoning of the Court and the Use of Article 117, Paragraph 1, of the 
Constitution 
 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the issues submitted were grounded on the 
basis of Article 117, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which reads: “Legislative 
powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the 
Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU-legislation and 
international obligations.” 
 
The content of Article 117, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, introduced after the 
2001 constitutional reform, was the subject of a strenuous debate between scholars, 
probably due to its concise and insufficiently articulated wording.24  Some scholars 
                                            
23 This change of circumstances followed the abovementioned 2001 constitutional reform and the 
introduction of the new Article 117, para. 1, of the Constitution. 
24 On this point see R. Bin, Le potestà legislative regionali dalla Bassanini ad oggi, in LE FONTI DEL DIRITTO 
REGIONALE ALLA RICERCA DI UNA NUOVA IDENTITÀ 140 (A. Ruggeri, G. Silvestri eds., 2001). 
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argued that the position of this provision in the Constitution’s structure25 proved 
that it could refer only to the relationship among sub-national legal orders that 
supplement the Italian Republic (Regions), and that its purpose was not that of 
governing their respective sources’ hierarchies.26  Others argued that the 
constitutional reform introduced a new mechanism, under which the norms 
implementing international law obligations in the domestic order can serve as an 
interposed standard of review.27  Therefore, as a consequence of the indirect conflict 
with Article 117, paragraph 1 of the Constitution,28 their violation by a national 
statutory norm would imply its unconstitutionality. 
 
The Constitutional Court explicitly adheres to the second interpretation, discarding 
the theory that this provision is just a rephrased edition of pre-existing 
constitutional norms (namely Articles 10 and 11) and that its efficacy is limited to 
the State–Regions relationship. 
 
The use of a merely contextual interpretation cannot supersede the literal meaning 
of the provision, thus, the international obligations’ limiting effect on domestic 
legislation cannot be confined to its domestic side only. 
 
The Court states that the duty to respect and perform international obligations 
affects univocally and globally the content of domestic legislation, whose validity 
obviously cannot depend on which point of view is under consideration (the 
reciprocal limitation of competences between State and Regions, rather than the 
extent of State legislative power as a whole).29 
                                            
25 Namely Article 117 is in part V of the Constitution, called Le Regioni, le Province, i Comuni. 
26 See C. Pinelli, I limiti generali alla potestà legislativa statale e regionale e di rapporti con l’ordinamento 
internazionale e comunitario, 126 FORO ITALIANO 194 (2001); E. Cannizzaro, La riforma federalista della 
costituzione e gli obblighi internazionali, 96 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 921 (2001). 
27 In general, on the interposed provision’s mechanism, see M. Siclari, LE NORME INTERPOSTE NEL 
GIUDIZIO DI COSTITUZIONALITÀ (1992).  The scholars have minted the wording “interposed provision” to 
individualize the cases in which a constitutional standard can be invoked only indirectly in a 
constitutional judicial proceeding, because different primary provisions are inserted between the 
constitutional standard and the reported provisions (suspicious of being unconstitutional).  See also, M. 
Siclari, La tecnica delle norme interposte, 133 FORO ITALIANO 337 (1998) (in which he recalls an old 
precedent of the Italian Constitutional Court, decision No. 46 of 1961, referred to the Convention of 
Paris, dated September 5, 1946, between Italy and Austria). 
28 See, among others, A. Guazzarotti, La CEDU e l’ordinamento nazionale: tendenze giurisprudenziali e nuove 
esigenze teoretiche, 26 QUAD. COST. 505 (2006); M. Cartabia, La CEDU e l’ordinamento italiano: rapporti tra 
fonti, rapporti tra giurisdizioni, in ALL’INCROCIO TRA COSTITUZIONE E CEDU, IL RANGO DELLE NORME DELLA 
CONVENZIONE E L'EFFICACIA INTERNA DELLE SENTENZE DI STRASBURGO 11 (R. Bin, G. Brunelli, A. Pugiotto, 
P. Veronesi  eds., 2007). 
29 See decision No. 348, para 4.4. 
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In particular, the standard set by Article 117, paragraph 1, can act only if the 
“international obligations” limiting state and regional normative power are 
defined: its role is to supplement, in the facts, the theoretical concept of 
“international obligation.”  The new Article 117, paragraph 1, in keeping with the 
constitutional charts of other European countries, filled a gap in the set of 
instruments and “principles that already guaranteed the respect of certain 
international obligations contracted by the State” at an ordinary level, as it permits 
a “shifting referral to treaty law relevant from time to time, that enlivens and gives 
body to those international obligations that are only generically referred to.”30 
 
This cannot imply that international treaty norms, including ECvHR norms, could 
bear a constitutional value and could, therefore, be free from any constitutional 
control; the judges defined their rank by referring to a new “intermediate source.”  
The ordinary judge has to draw the domestic provision consistently with the 
international provision, as far as allowed by the literal meaning of the norms 
regulating such an activity. The Court argued that, were this operation infeasible, 
or in case the judge had doubts on the international norm’s constitutionality, a 
conflict between a statutory norm and a conventional norm would give rise to a 
constitutionality issue on the basis of a potential violation of Article 117, paragraph 
1, and such a conflict would be exclusively up to the competence of the 
constitutional judge to decide.31 
 
Decision No. 348 clarified the standard of review’s nature.  With it the Court 
decided to perform the constitutionality test in two phases.  First, it checked 
whether it was possible to identify an unsolvable conflict between the challenged 
provision and the ECvHR norm, as interpreted by the ECtHR, and whether such a 
conflict could be composed by an adapting interpretation. Second, the Court 
verified whether the ECvHR norms, integrating the standard of review, were 
compatible with the Italian constitutional order.32 
 
To do so, the Court took all relevant ECtHR case law under consideration, since 
“ECvHR law lives in the interpretation given by the ECtHR on it,” and because the 
constitutionality test’s object is to view the norm as the product of an interpretation 
activity, rather than just the provision in itself. 
 
                                            
30 See decision No. 349, para 6.2. 
31 See decision No. 349, para 6.2, and No.348, para 4.7. 
32 See decision No. 348, para. 4.7 and 5. 
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The Court investigated the rationes decidendi of the two case laws (its own and the 
ECtHR’s), and found out that the Italian and European Courts had, allegedly, 
followed a similar argumentation:33 the dispossessed owner’s property right can be 
partially sacrificed for public interest purposes, thus, the compensation offered 
must not necessarily equal the good’s market value, although it has to represent a 
significant compensation for the owner.  The diverging outcome reached by the two 
case laws was due, in fact, to the different conceptions of the significance of the 
compensation offered by the Public Administration.  Whereas the provisions 
contained in the Constitution are vague enough to permit a lower refund, the 
ECvHR is clear in its request for a significant reimbursement; moreover, the criteria 
set by domestic regulation in order to quantify the compensation were justified at 
the time of their adoption by their transitory nature, and by the serious economical 
situation that Italy was facing. 
 
As for the time being, the Court notes that the then provisional criterion was given 
stability by June 8, 2001 presidential Decree, No. 327, Article 37; therefore one of the 
reasons for conceding provisional constitutionality to the norm ceased to exist, 
since it could not be maintained that a state of crisis “can last forever, therefore 
conferring the legislation a nature of everlasting exceptionality.”  Hence, a 
significant and suitable compensation “cannot take the market value as merely a 
starting parameter, on which further modifications intervene, based on elements 
that are totally extraneous to the good’s value.”  Whilst the rental income’s (reddito 
dominicale) value still bears a connection, albeit weak, with the market value, a 
further decrease of 40% is deprived of any ground, except for a purely arithmetic 
one, concerning the good’s value.34 
 
In sum, the challenged provision, setting an indemnity having a value equal to 
between 50% and 30% of the land’s market value, fails the constitutionality test 
with regard to the “reasonable relation” with the market value, which is a condition 
required by the Strasbourg Court’s case law and which is also consistent with the 
“significant refund” (serio ristoro) condition set in the same Constitutional Court’s 
case law.35 
                                            
33 On the tendency of the Constitutional Court to underline the common points between its 
jurisprudence and ECtHR’s jurisprudence, as a first step of dialogue between the two Courts, see C. 
Napoli, La nuova collocazione della CEDU nel sistema delle fonti e le conseguenti prospettive di dialogo tra le 
Corti, 28 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 139 (2008). 
34 See decision No. 348, para. 5.6. 
35 As the Court, itself, states: “this compensation is below the minimum threshold of acceptability for an 
indemnification granted to dispossessed owners, as the even limited amount offered is further 
diminished because of taxes equaling – as the claimant notes – the level of about 20 per cent.  The due 
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The Court maintains that the legislator is not forced to provide for the equivalence 
between the compensation and the market value: in fact, the Article 42 of the 
Constitution acknowledges and protects property rights, emphasizing its social 
purpose, which “the legislator and the interpreters must assure in relation with Article 2, 
which calls for the performance of imperative duties of economic and social solidarity by 
every citizens.” 
 
Furthermore, the judges maintain that “excessively high expenditure standards 
connected with the expropriation of building areas for public purposes could 
seriously jeopardize the effective safeguard of several fundamental constitutional 
rights (such as health protection, a right to education, a right to housing, etc.), 
moreover, these standards could hamper the implementation of public facilities 
needed to strengthen the exercise of private enterprise.” 
 
Thus, it is up to the legislator to assess whether the balance between the private 
interest and the property’s social purpose “has to be fixed and unvarying or, 
according to ECtHR’s guideline, it has to be struck in a mutable way, depending on 
the qualification of the public interest purposes pursued.”  Nevertheless, single 
expropriations carried out for limited interest purposes cannot be incorporated to 
big expropriation plans intended to facilitate economic reform planned 
interventions, or to foster better social justice conditions. 
 
Likewise, in Decision No. 349, the Constitutional Court reassessed both its own 
case-laws and the ECtHR’s  in order to collect useful material to its task, i.e. the 
constitutional control over the criteria set to calculate compensation for unlawful 
expropriation.  The Court took avail of this retrospective analysis in mentioning the 
reasons that led it to find such provisions constitutional under Articles 3 and 42 of 
the Constitution in the past. 
 
More specifically, the Court remarked on the lack of constitutional support for the 
criterion providing full compensation for damages, on the “exceptional nature of 
the case,” due “mainly to the provisional nature of the challenged provision,” and 
on the need to safeguard an unavoidable and transitory public recovery plan.36 
 
However, the constitutional judges observed that the balance struck in the past, 
with reference to other review standards, should now be struck bearing in mind the 
                                                                                                                
sacrifice that public interest can demand cannot end up by consisting in the virtual nullification of the 
good possessed” (decision No. 348, para. 5.7). 
36 See Italian Constitutional Court decisions No. 148/1999 and No. 24/2000. 
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importance of the international obligations undertaken by Italy’s.  That is, the 
criterion setting a lower compensation than the good’s market value enters into 
conflict with the norm of ECvHR’s Protocol 1, Article 1, as interpreted in well-
established case law.  Therefore, the Italian regulation on this matter is 
incompatible with Article 1 and, consequently, with the new Article 117, paragraph 
1 of the Constitution. 
 
In light of this new standard of review, the Court stated that the Italian rule could 
not represent a valid alternative to the requirements set by the ECvHR, not even in 
the framework of the Italian constitutional principles. 
 
However, we must specify that the change in the circumstances played a different 
role in the decisions being assessed.  In decision No. 348, indeed, the alteration 
occurred could have led the Court to abandon the position held in the past and to 
state the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm on the basis of Article 42 of the 
Constitution since the circumstances that had prevented the conflict from being 
ascertained were no longer occurring.  On the other hand, the norm under 
consideration in decision No. 349 had a mere retroactive effect;37 therefore, the 
constitutionality decision supported by the “circumstantial” argument would have 
had a permanent effect (this norm applies to past facts only, and a crisis was 
occurring at the time of these facts), rather than a provisional one.  It is hard to 
understand how the Italian Court could now appeal to the change of circumstances 
as a valid cause to overturn its precedent.  It is obvious that the position held by the 
Strasbourg Court played a major role in convincing the Italian Court to rethink its 
case law.38 
                                            
37 It applied to unlawful expropriations carried out before September 30, 1996. 
38 On this point, see A. Guazzarotti, La Corte e la CEDU: il problematico confronto di standard di tutela alla 
luce dell’articolo 117, co. 1, Cost, 53 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE (forthcoming 2008), who also 
underlines that, in its decision No. 349/2007, the Italian Court borrows one of the main arguments the 
ECtHR had used to blame the practice of unlawful expropriation, namely the “need for granting the 
administrative action’s legality and the public officers’ liability principle for damages to third parties.”  
This reasoning apparently counters the position adopted by the Italian Court in the decision No. 
148/1999, in which it denied that Articles 28 and 97 of the Constitution could be standards of review for 
the challenged provisions on unlawful expropriation constitutionality.  In fact, this ambiguity is due to a 
bigger divergence between the Constitutional Court’s case law and the ECtHR’s, as regards the potential 
use of the social function of property to counterbalance the otherwise neat rule whereunder only lawful 
expropriations or full compensation are admitted.  According to the Constitutional Court’s case law, 
indeed, the social function (as pursuant to Article 42 of the Constitution) could justify the property 
deprivation suffered by an individual due to unlawful expropriation procedures, provided that the 
buildings on the land are of some public interest.  On the contrary, the ECtHR maintains that it is not 
even possible to access the stage of balancing private and public interests when the expropriation lacks a 
legal justification (as it is in the case of acquisition by right of occupancy’s Italian practice (occupazione 
acquisitive)). 
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Less than a month after the date of these decisions, the domestic legislator adopted 
the 2008 budget-law, whereby it modified the criteria of compensation we have 
examined.  In particular, a full compensation (that is, of a value equal to the market 
price) is due in case of expropriation of building areas, unless the intervention 
forms part of a wider policy of “socio-economic reform,” in that case a 25% 
reduction can apply.39  Concerning unlawful expropriation (as more fully described 
above), expropriations stemmed from an expropriation order dated on or before 
September 30, 1996 must be compensated awarding a sum equalling the market 
value of the estate (see Article 2, para. 89, of Law December 24, 2007, No. 244).40 
 
The Supreme Court already applied these new criteria, in Decision No. 8384 of 
March 30, 2008, concerning a case of unlawful expropriation, and stated that the 
change determined by the new provision applies when the calculation of the 
compensation amount is still under discussion during the trial, and that such 
amount cannot be higher than the income the owner could gain selling the estate. 
 
This normative intervention has been opportune, as it filled the gap created by the 
Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality.  It is, nevertheless, difficult to foresee 
how ordinary judges will interpret the norm on expropriation for public purposes, 
as regarding the definition of “socio-economic reforms.”  The judge now has the 
task to delimit this definition, in light of the rich case-law of the Strasbourg Court.  
It will be, in fact, a perfect trial run for the newly clarified (conventionally) 
consistent interpretation advocated by the Constitutional Court. 
 
D.  The Constitutional Device for International Treaty Law 
 
In these decisions the Court tries to sum up all the relevant theories concerning the 
place occupied by international norms within the Italian normative hierarchy in 
order to get rid of the different interpretations supported by the scholars, based on 
Article 10 and Article 11 of the Constitution, and to prevent the chosen one from 
                                            
39 These provisions apply also on currently ongoing expropriation procedures, unless the expropriated 
owner accepted, or agreed with, the compensation proposal by the Public Authority, or the 
determination of the compensation has already become irrevocable. 
40 See A. Travi, In tema di compatibilità della legge italiana con la Cedu, 133 FORO ITALIANO 41 (2008).  The 
Author stresses how the Court had stated, in the No. 348 decision, that the legislator could adjust the 
compensation mechanism consistently with Article 42 of the Constitution, without being obliged to 
provide for the full compensation.  On how the Constitutional Court often provides the necessary 
instruction to implement its rulings, and on the difference existing between the No. 348 and the No. 349 
decisions as regards the quantification of the compensation, see L. Cappuccio, La Corte costituzionale 
interviene sui rapporti tra convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e Costituzione, 133 FORO ITALIANO 50 
(2008).  
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any possible criticism.41  This work, albeit useful under a scientific point of view, 
was ultroneous and somehow unnecessary, since the constitutionality issues were 
based only on Articles 111 and 117 of the Constitution. 
 
First of all, the Court ruled out the possibility for international treaty law to enter 
the Italian legal system with the status of a (super) constitutional source under 
Article 10 of the Constitution, which provides for the “automatic adaptation” of the 
domestic legal order to the general principles and the customary norms of 
international law.42  In order to dismiss this theory, the Court needs only verify that 
the norms contained in bilateral or multilateral international treaties are not 
supported by the extent of Article 10, and that not even the norms bearing a general 
nature represent an exception. 
 
Here it suffices to recall how the firm rejection of this interpretation prevents the 
possibility of recalling an impressive theory upheld in the past by a minority of 
scholars,43 according to which Article 10 guarantees the automatic adaptation of 
Italian law to the well-established international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
among others. This would also imply that Italy must conform automatically to 
“agreed law,” such as international treaties.  Furthermore, it is far from certain that 
the ECvHR does not contain any norm that could be considered of a customary 
nature: in fact, some of the human rights therein listed are acknowledged by 
virtually every State of the International Community.44  
 
After ruling out the possible application of Article 10, the Court moved on to 
Article 11 of the Constitution, which allows Italy to accept the sovereignty 
limitations needed to attain peace and justice in the International Community.45  
Originally conceived to permit the Italian membership in the United Nations, this 
                                            
41 For the debate about the position of the ECvHR in the Italian normative hierarchy, see D. Tega, La 
Cedu e l’ordinamento italiano, in I DIRITTI IN AZIONE 71 (M. Cartabia ed., 2007).  For a specific reference to 
the constitutional rulings commented here, see S. Bartole, Considerazioni brevi sulle possibili alternative, in 
ALL’INCROCIO TRA COSTITUZIONE E CEDU 27 (R. Bin, G. Brunelli, A. Pugiotto, P. Veronesi eds., 2007). 
42 See 349, para. 6.1; 348, para. 3.4. 
43 See R. Quadri, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBBLICO (1956). 
44 See for instance the membership of the UN Convention for the rights of the Child, which totals now 
193 members. 
45 Article 11 reads: “Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedoms of others 
peoples and as a means for settling international controversies; it agrees, on conditions of equality with 
other states, to the limitations of sovereignty necessary for an order that ensures peace and justice 
among Nations; it promotes and encourages international organizations having such ends in view.” 
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provision has been successively interpreted in order to justify the primacy of EC 
law over domestic law.46 
 
The Court, referring to its previous decision No. 188/1980, states that the Council of 
Europe (hereinafter, the “CoE”) (i.e. the legal order in which the European 
Convention is rooted) lacks the preliminary condition required by Article 11 to 
have sovereignty limitations permitted and supported by the Constitution, namely, 
it lacks a full-fledged organizational structure.  Moreover Italy has not given up any 
portion of sovereignty when joining the system of the CoE, and thus it is 
inappropriate to appeal to Article 11, as there are no limitations at stake.47  
Although this argument could have been reasonable in 1980, it became debatable 
after 1998, when ECvHR Protocol XI entered into force “turning upside down” the 
general system of the ECvHR.48  Indeed, it amended the Convention, making the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR on individuals’ claims compulsory and freeing the 
Ministers’ Committee from the competence to decide the claims on the merits. 
 
Only a continuous comparison between the CoE and the European Union makes 
the reasoning of the Court fully understandable, so that it is more a question of how 
much the CoE differs from the EU than a matter of how respondent the former is to 
the Article 11 test.49  A mechanical analysis of the CoE’s features would probably 
lead us to maintain its compatibility with the provision of Article 11.  It is not 
unreasonable to define it as an international organization, furthermore over the 
years its original features have evolved towards a more constitutional status of the 
whole institution.  The execution of the 1998 Protocol, which is the first evidence of 
the constitutional process supporting the CoE’s action in the field of human rights 
as well as other recent trends adopted by the Court, seem to confirm this point of 
                                            
46 See decision 349, para. 6.1. 
47 See decision 348 para. 3.3: “this Court had already excluded [even before acknowledging the direct 
effect of community legislation in 1984] that Article 11 could apply [to ECHR norms], as no limitation to 
national sovereignty can be envisaged, as concerns the specific treaty law under examination.” 
48 As A. Guazzarotti notes in his essay, A. Guazzarotti, La Consulta guarda in faccia agli obblighi 
internazionali e alla CEDU, 14 STUDIUM IURIS 275 (2008).  It is worth mentioning that Italy has also ratified 
the XIV Protocol, that foresees an infringement procedure if a member State does not observe an 
ECtHR’s decision.  This mechanism will obviously strengthen the CoE system; the Protocol will enter 
into force upon full ratification (so far only Russia has not ratified it yet). 
49 See for instance A. Ruggeri, La CEDU alla ricerca di una nuova identità, tra prospettiva formale-astratta e 
prospettiva assiologico-sostanziale d’inquadramento sistematico (a prima lettura di Corte cost. nn. 348 e 349 del 
2007), available at:  www.forumcostituzionale.it (noticing that “The Court relies on an old 1980 
precedent, to which it explicitly refers, where however the extraneousness of the European Convention 
to Article 11 was not proven, as it is not proven today.”). 
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view.50  Moreover, its competence in the safeguard of human rights obviously 
contributes to strengthen peace and justice among Nations, as required under 
Article 11.51  The Court, however, suggests a shifty interpretation of Article 11 of 
the Constitution by construing it as a description of the Community legal system; a 
description that the CoE obviously cannot match.52 
 
The aforementioned tendentious interpretation is clearly reflected in the passage 
where the Court states that the Convention “does not set up a supranational legal 
order, thus it does not produce norms that have a direct applicability in State 
parties.”53  Moreover, the Court seems to misinterpret the extent of the “limitations 
of sovereignty” formula, somehow identifying sovereignty (as a whole) with one of 
its components, normative autonomy;54 once again the model envisaged is the EC 
one.  Because of EC exclusive (normative) competence in certain areas,55 the Court 
does not deem the Convention, which indeed limits the discretion and the freedom 
of the Italian legislator (i.e., it limits its sovereignty), to create a legal order which 
matches the Article 11 exception.  As a final remark, we just remind how the now 
fully-fledged EC legal order was born indeed as a limited international economic 
treaty, and thus the choice of the Constitutional Court to use the instrument of 
Article 11 for its legal justification was, at the time, more debatable than it would be 
now for the CoE system. 
 
                                            
50 Indeed, the Court has started in its decisions, to ask the States not only to redress the single violation 
ascertained during the trial, but also to adopt structural solutions to avoid its occurrence in the future.  
This proves that the ECtHR is “constitutionally” concerned in the overall conduct of the State, rather 
than being just “jurisdictionally” conferred the authority to adjudicate rights in single proceedings. 
51 See also the reasoning made by the Court itself in its No.183 decision of 1973, in which the 
membership to the European Community is fully justified under the terms of Article 11, and the extent 
of this norm is explained into details. 
52 See A. Ruggeri, supra note 49, at 3. The Author explains how the Court interprets Article 11 as a 
“snapshot norm,” which portrays the EC order.  This explains why the Court, while verifying the 
possible application of Article 11, feels the need for reassessing “the distinction between the ECHR 
norms and community norms” based on the lack of direct effect in the domestic order of the 
conventional legislation, which is binding on States only. 
53 See decision No. 348, para. 3.3. 
54 See C. Zanghì, La Corte costituzionale risolve un primo contrasto con la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ed 
interpreta l’art. 117 della Costituzione: le sentenze n. 348 e 349 del 2007, 8, available at:  www.giurcost.it. 
55 In other words, the Court confuses limitations of sovereignty, that may be permitted unilaterally by 
the States, and cessions of sovereignty, that imply a legal order receiving the competence surrendered by 
the State, like the EU. 
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Once it outlined the comparison between the Convention and the EC law, the Court 
moved on to investigate the matter in-depth, and to disprove the possible 
recognition of ECvHR as part of the EC law.  If the ECvHR law were to share the 
EC nature, in fact, it would also enjoy its supremacy status and would supersede 
conflicting, ordinary national legislation without any balancing intervention.  In the 
view of the Constitutional Court, the “communitarisation” of the European 
Convention has not been completed yet, and the fact that Article 6.2 of the TEU 
counts the Convention among the general principles of community law is not 
enough to determine its binding force “outside” the field of EC law.  As the Court 
states:  
 
[T]he case-law, indeed, tends to understand 
fundamental rights as an integral part of the 
general principles of community law that are 
enforced by the community judge [...].  
Nevertheless, such principles are relevant only in 
connection with matters to which community law 
applies: Community acts, domestic acts that 
execute Community legislation, national 
derogations to Community law justified by their 
purpose of promoting the respect of fundamental 
rights.56 
 
The interpretation that the Court gives Article 6.2 recalls the mechanisms codified 
in Article 51.1 of the Nice Charter,57 that of the Charter efficacy’s limitation to the 
implementation of Union law by Member States’ bodies. 
 
Human rights, as the Court maintains, do not fall within the Union’s competence, 
therefore the relationship between the CoE system and domestic legal orders “is 
diversely but steadily regulated within each national system.”58 
                                            
56 See 349, para. 6.1 
57 Which reads: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union 
with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law.  They shall, therefore, respect the rights, observe the principles and promote 
the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers.” 
58 See decision No. 349, para. 6.1. In addition, see the European Court of Justice order C-302/06 of 
January 25, 2007,  František Koval’ský: “De même, la situation des requérant et intervenants au principal 
ne relève aucunement du champ d’application du droit communautaire. En effet, le juge national n’a pas 
établi en quoi la situation d’un propriétaire, dont le terrain est occupé par des installations électriques et 
qui, en contrepartie de cette occupation, demande le versement d’une somme à titre de compensation, 
peut se rattacher au droit communautaire." 
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The Court quickly refers to the EU’s potential membership to the Convention (a 
hypothesis set forth in the Constitutional Treaty, and dismissed after its failure), 
but does not take the trouble of analyzing its consequence on the 
communitarization of ECHR law in-depth since, at the very time the twin decisions 
were issued, this seemed a merely theoretical exercise.  Instead, just a couple of 
months after the decisions, the Lisbon Treaty was approved, providing for EU 
accession to the ECvHR (see Article 6).59  Although the new treaty has not entered 
into force yet, and even if the effects of the ECvHR would be limited to areas of 
competence delivered to the EU by the States,60 it would have been advisable for 
the Court to spend some words explaining the legal implications of having ECvHR 
bindings on EU bodies. 
 
What’s more, some cases already occurred where EU acts conflicting with ECtHR 
law were contested before the Luxembourg Court by Community bodies.  We recall 
here, for instance, how the Parliament maintained,61 referring to the alleged 
illegitimacy of a directive adopted by the European Union Council, that: the 
“contested provisions do not respect fundamental rights – in particular the right to 
family life and the right to non-discrimination – as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed 
in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’) and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States of the European Union, as 
general principles of Community law; the Union has a duty to respect them 
                                            
59 On the Lisbon treaty and fundamental rights protection see P. Passaglia, Il trattato di Lisbona: qualche 
passo indietro per andare avanti, 133 FORO ITALIANO 43 (2008); and A. Ruggeri, Ancora in tema di rapporti tra 
CEDU e Costituzione: profili teorici e questioni pratiche, available at:  
www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it. 
60 See the statement by the Secretary General Terry Davis, Press release 699/2007 (Strasbourg, October 
19, 2007): “I welcome the fact that Article 6 of the new Reform Treaty establishes the legal basis for EU 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. EU accession to this Council of Europe 
Convention will close an important gap in human rights protection in Europe, and people will no longer 
be deprived of the right to complain about abuses of their human rights committed in areas in which EU 
member states have transferred their powers to Brussels.  Of course, I can appreciate that this accession 
can only take place after the Reform Treaty has entered into force, and that it is likely to take some time.  
In the meantime we will need to resolve several legal, administrative and financial issues.  All these 
arrangements will need to be agreed not only by the EU, but also by the 47 member countries of the 
Council of Europe.  That is why the talks should start immediately.” 
61 See C- 540/03 of June 27, 2006, Parliament v. Council, dealing with an action of annulment (as pursuant 
Article 230 TEC) of the last subparagraph of Art 4, para. 1 and 6, and Article 8 of the 2003/86 directive 
on the right to family reunification. 
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pursuant to Article 6(2) EU, to which Article 46(d) EU refers with regard to action 
of the institutions.”62 
 
Although the ECJ did not find that the challenged norms threatened the exercise of 
fundamental rights, in particular the right to family life under Article 8 of the 
ECvHR, it nevertheless maintained that fundamental rights form an integral part of 
the general law principles the observance of which is ensured by the Court.  
Moreover, the ECvHR has special significance in that respect, even under Article 6, 
No. 2, of the TEU, which reads: “the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights and, as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law.”63 
 
The reasoning of the Court, surprisingly, does not deal with the potential function 
of Constitution Article 2 regarding the ECvHR.64  Indeed, many authors have 
supported the idea that the Convention could be given a constitutional nature 
through the application of Article 2, which makes a generic reference to the 
fundamental rights’ safeguard offered by the Republic of Italy and, according to a 
widespread interpretation, can include rights that are not explicitly provided in the 
Constitution.65 
 
                                            
62 See judgment of June 27, 2006, para. 30. 
63 See judgment of June 27, 2006, para. 35, 36 and 37. In particular the Court recalls, inter alia, Case C-
260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 41; Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, paragraph 33; Case C-
274/99 P. Connolly v. Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 37; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] 
ECR I-9011, paragraph 25; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 71; and Case C-
36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, paragraph 33.  On this point see M. E. Gennusa, La Cedu e l’Unione 
europea, in I DIRITTI IN AZIONE 91 (M. Cartabia ed., 2007). 
64 See D. Tega, Le sentenze della Corte Costituzionale nn. 348 e 349 del 2007: la Cedu da fonte ordinaria a fonte 
“sub-costituzionale” del diritto, 28 QUADERNI COSTITUTIONALI 133 (2008); C. Pinelli, Sul trattamento 
giurisdizionale della Cedu e delle leggi con essa confliggenti, available at:  
www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it; and A. Ruggeri, supra note 49. 
65 Indeed, in decision No. 38 and 159 of 1973 and No. 1150 of 1988, Article 2 of the Constitution is used 
by the Constitutional Court in order to give constitutional value to some rights recognized in 
international treaties such as the right to privacy, based on Article 8 and Article 10 of the ECvHR, that 
are recalled together with Article 2.  More clearly, with the decision No. 388 of 1999, the Court affirms 
that the human rights guaranteed by the ECvHR and by other international conventions find expression 
and guarantee in the Article 2 of the Constitution; under the general referral to fundamental human 
rights therein included, moreover, the different formulations used to express them integrate each other, 
and mutually complete each other in the interpretation, besides the potential coincidence that there 
could be in two charters on the definition of the same right.  On the interpretation of Article 2 as a 
standard that can give a constitutional value to any right see A. Barbera, Commento all’art. 2, in 
COMMENTARIO DELLA COSTITUZIONE, 50 (G. Branca ed., 1975).  
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E.  The Position of International Treaty Law in the Domestic Hierarchy of Legal 
Sources 
 
After carefully explaining the reasons why Article 10 and Article 11 cannot serve as 
a standard of review (more precisely, as an instrument to give the Convention 
constitutional rank in the Italian system), the Court resorted to the recently 
amended Article 117, para. 1, of the Constitution, as formerly explained (see part 
III). 
 
The Protocol’s norm, therefore, could not reach a constitutional level, and the Court 
could use it as a standard of review only if recurring to Article 117, para. 1.  At this 
point, the Court had to specify which rank the Convention (and international treaty 
law, more generally) could be granted in the domestic legal order. 
 
With regard to placing international treaty law in the domestic hierarchy of legal 
sources, the Court refers to its own well-established position, reaffirming the 
peaceful general rule according to which, in the lack of any specific constitutional 
provision, international norms enter the Italian system with the same rank of the 
Italian legal act which implements them.66  Since the Convention is given force of 
law through an act of ordinary law in the Italian order, that will be the place in the 
system of sources occupied by its norms, next to other Italian statute laws: first of 
all this means that the Convention sets itself below the Constitution.67 
 
The platform of Article 117, para. 1, guarantees an “infra-constitutional” rank to 
international treaty law (ECHR included) in the Italian legal order, and the 
introduction of this intermediate position – halfway between ordinary law and 
constitutional law - carries along several technical implications, not to mention 
systemic problems. 
 
As the Court specifies, an extra source requires a more articulated scheme of inner 
consistency among the norms: whilst the traditional two-sided constitutionality test 
is fairly direct (the statute must conform with the Constitution), this three-element 
relationship requires not only the statute’s consistency with the international norm, 
but also its consistency with the Constitution, although the latter is not a certain 
outcome. 
 
                                            
66 See decision No. 188 of 1980 cited above, where the Court states that it is not possible to conceive a 
constitutionality question founded on conventional provisions used as standard of review. 
67 See decision No. 349, para. 6.1.1. 
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Besides, the constitutionality of the international norm must be verified as well, 
given its position in the hierarchy: the use of Article 117 to “constitutionalise”68 the 
international norm versus the statutory act (and, as a result, to challenge its 
constitutionality) is a legitimate operation only if a preemptive condition is fully 
met, that is, the international norm must not incorporate any aspect of 
unconstitutionality.69 
 
In other words, since the international norm ends by working as a standard of 
(constitutional) review, it must implicitly reflect the nature of the higher source 
which it surrogates: by conforming with the international norm the statute must 
automatically conform with the Constitution, a three-cornered test is a non-feasible 
solution, and could lead to confusing results. 
 
This mechanism obviously requires that the international provision does not enter 
into conflict with any constitutional provision, as there is no room for carving out a 
“hard core” theory in which a limited set of fundamental constitutional values 
could nullify the international norm’s influence on the domestic order.70  In fact, the 
structure outlined by the Court bears a defined hierarchical aspect: the relationship 
between charters of rights (such as the Constitution and the European Convention) 
is played less on an axiological ground (where values could exceptionally prevail) 
than on a formalistic one (where rules must necessarily apply).71 
 
The ordinary judge, therefore, cannot apply traditional criteria to a conflict between 
the statutory domestic law and the international norm (i.e. the lex posterior and lex 
specialis principles, that rule the contrast between norms of the same rank).  In fact, 
whilst in the past the judge in such a conflict could behave just as he was handling 
                                            
68 We use this term to simplify, although the constitutional status is never reached by the interposed 
international law provision.  Besides, the aforementioned mechanism never has the ability to sort this 
effect, see N. Pignatelli, La dilatazione della tecnica della “interposizione” (e del giudizio costituzionale), 28 
QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI  140 (2008). 
69 On this kind of control, see S. Mirate, Indennità di esproprio e risarcimento da occupazione acquisitiva: la 
Corte costituzionale inaugura il giudizio di convenzionalità ex art. 117 Cost., 89 RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE E 
PREVIDENZA 73 (2008); S. Mirate, GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA E CONVENZIONE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI 
DELL'UOMO. L'ALTRO DIRITTO EUROPEO IN ITALIA, FRANCIA E INGHILTERRA (2007) (published a few weeks 
before the decisions No. 348 and 349). 
70 See part VI below. 
71 See A. Ruggeri, supra note 49.  See also R. Conti, La Corte costituzionale viaggia verso i diritti CEDU: 
prima fermata verso Strasburgo, 25 CORRIERE GIURIDICO 206 (2008) (“It seems like the rank of the 
Convention as a source does not protect the rights of the Convention from those internal domestic 
regulatory provisions implementing rights set forth under the Constitution.”). 
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two equivalent provisions72 (as it actually was the case: a domestic statute vis-à-vis 
another domestic statute, with the latter implementing the international treaty 
norm),  now the judge cannot compose the clash by his own instruments.  It is no 
more a matter of application of the prevailing norm, but rather a question of 
constitutionality, and such an issue can be dealt with only by the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
The Court definitely includes among its prerogatives the task of verifying the 
constitutionality of international law adhered to by Italy, although admitting in the 
case at stake that - since the Convention and the Constitution do treat values that 
sometimes are very similar in a fairly similar way - it is highly unlikely that this test 
would lead to a decision in which the Court rejects a Convention’s norm due to the 
fact that its conflict with a constitutional provision cannot be resolved. 
 
It is, nevertheless, difficult to understand what the Court refers to when it mentions 
the possibility of “balancing” the values enshrined in the Convention’s provisions 
with the values granted by the Constitution, in a way that - we can only suppose - 
would lead to a situation where the domestic statute prevails over the international 
law’s provision, as the values enshrined in the former deserve a stronger protection 
than the values implemented by the latter.73  This situation would contravene the 
“double conformity test” (conventionality and constitutionality) set up by the 
Court.  As a matter of fact, such a test only admits yes/no responses; whereas the 
balancing moment is not foreseen. 
 
Secondarily, we would like to underline that the “balancing” operation described 
by the Court could conceal a double nature.  As said, the fact that the conventional 
norm could be overcome by the national ordinary source as a result of the 
balancing activity is a perspective that undermines the evolutionary momentum 
that seemed to support these decisions.  On the other hand, a balancing comparison 
can be carried out only between elements of the same nature/rank: therefore it 
would be implicit in the Court’s call for a settling of values that the conventional 
norm be of the same Constitutional norm’s rank.74  This ambiguity is likely to 
depend on the contrast between the opinions of single constitutional judges on the 
matter at stake. 
 
                                            
72 Not to mention the risk that the prevalence of the domestic norm on the international one could entail 
the State’s international responsibility. 
73 See A. Ruggeri, supra note 49; and R. Conti, supra note 71, at 214. 
74 See V. Sciarabba, Nuovi punti fermi (e questioni aperte) nei rapporti tra fonti e corti nazionali ed 
internazionali, available at: www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it. 
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Bearing in mind that in the Italian constitutional trial there is no space for 
concurring or dissenting opinions: the adopted decision must be agreed upon, at 
least formally, by the whole Court.  This requirement could have led to some 
problems in the formulation of some parts of each one of the decisions under 
consideration.  For instance, it would be difficult to explain why after having set 
forth the above described precise, and hierarchically inspired, conformity test, the 
Court somehow disregarded it, and seemed to alter its original intention with some 
sudden axiological flares such as the call for a balancing moment.   
 
Our view seems to be supported by a comparison between the two sentences.  
Whilst in decision No. 348, the few lines on the “balancing” clarify that the Court 
intends to maintain the power to compare the international norm with the domestic 
norm’s content, in decision No. 349 the balancing is mentioned only once, 
apparently only to explain the creation of the new source’s hierarchy (putting the 
international norm between the ordinary norm and the Constitution represents, in 
itself, a balancing choice).75  In addition, while explaining how this compatibility 
test works, the No. 349 text talks about the “compatibility of the ECvHR provision 
... with the relevant provisions of the Constitution” (emphasis added).  This 
decision seems not to take into consideration the principle repeatedly emphasized 
by the other decision, that of the necessity for the international norm to conform to 
the whole set of the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
F.  The Decision Avoided by the Constitutional Court:  The Disapplication of the 
Internal Provisions Contrasting the ECvHR.  Disapplication versus Direct 
Application of the International Norm 
 
As we said above, the fact that the ECvHR lacks a constitutional rank and that no 
sovereignty limitation can be envisaged impedes the possibility of a disapplication 
practice by the ordinary judge.  The Court condemned the practice of disapplication 
that some judges had already begun to adopt, when they applied the international 
norm and, at the same time, made Italian applicable law recede.76 
 
Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the Convention is a fundamental charter, as it 
protects and fosters fundamental human rights and freedoms, but it still consists in 
                                            
75 See the last words of para. 6.2 of decision No. 349, read “In this way [that is, by checking the ECvHR’s 
conformity with the Constitution] the correct balance is struck.”  The fact that the two decisions have 
been written by two different judges could help us appreciate the difference.  In particular, a 
constitutional law professor wrote decision No. 348 (the one calling for the balancing moment), whereas 
a Community law professor wrote the decision No. 349 (which virtually ignores the aforementioned 
balancing aspect).  
76 See decision No. 348, para. 3.3. 
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a treaty source, that is, it binds the State without having a direct effect in the 
domestic order: national judges, therefore, cannot apply the Convention in trials 
before them, disapplying at the same time the internal norms in potential conflict 
with it.77 
 
As said above, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court recently, 
respectively, joined and welcomed the disapplication practice started by some 
Courts of first instance.78  The Constitutional Court, as in regard to these recent 
trends, took the chance to express its criticism. 
 
This refusal, at first sight, deprives the ordinary judge of its status of “natural judge 
of the Convention,”79 and determines a material difference with its duties regarding 
the application of EC law (see below).80 
 
In fact, the Court rejects the possibility of the disapplication only, but it does not 
adopt a clear position on the direct application of the international norm, which is, 
therefore, allowed.  This could mean, in other words, that the ordinary judge is, 
indeed, entitled to apply the conventional norm directly,81 when for instance there 
                                            
77 See decision No. 348, ibidem. 
78 See the recent decision issued by the Court of Pistoia on March 23, 2007: the judge disapplied Article 
80, para. 19 of Law 388 of 2000, concerning the immigrant’s right to the social allowance, because it 
conflicted with Article 14 ECvHR.  On this point see also Court of Genoa, decision of November 23, 2000; 
Court of Appeal of Florence decisions No. 570 of 2005 and No. 1403 of 2006, and the Administrative 
Supreme Court (Consiglio di Stato), I Section, decision No. 1926 of 2002, whereby the Administrative 
Supreme Court carefully considers the legal ground of the disapplication, reflecting upon the direct 
effect of the Convention.  See also the Court of Appeal of Rome decision of April 11, 2002, in which 
Article 6, para. 3, let. c), of the ECvHR is applied directly instead of the relevant Italian provision. Even 
within the Supreme Court’s case law different trends could be identified: with the decision No. 28507 of 
2005, given on Plenary Session, the Supreme Court recalls the decision No. 10542 of 2002, which 
synthetically calls for the obligation to disapply the internal provision conflicting with the treaty source 
bearing direct effect.  Besides these decisions, however, the orders of referrals that triggered the 
constitutionality trial under consideration must be taken into account, where the Supreme Court denies 
that the ordinary judge can disapply provisions conflicting with the ECvHR. 
79 Acknowledged by the Court in the decision No. 349, para. 6.2. 
80 We must here mention how the Constitutional Court has regularly referred to the disapplication 
practice described here using the “non application” formula, in order not to stress the unavoidable 
precedence EC law has on the domestic norm: the mere non application (i.e. the suspension) of the 
domestic provision sounds less embarrassing than its neat disapplication (which seems to imply a 
negative judgment on the disapplied norm).  See the decision No. 168 of 1991, where the Court expressly 
talks about the effect of  “non application” created by the EC legislation, and advices to avoid the use of 
the “disapplication” term. 
81 See for instance the position of the Supreme Court in its decision of April 5, 2005, No. 7923: “the 
Convention’s provisions impose on the contracting States legal obligations bearing a direct effect” and 
                                                                                         [Vol. 09  No. 07 914  G E R M A N  L A W  J O U R N A L  
is a vacuum in the domestic regulation.  The problem arises, in the Court’s view, 
only when the direct application implies supersession of the relevant Italian norm 
(i.e., a disapplication). 
 
Accordingly, the judge should behave very differently, depending on whether the 
international norm insists on a matter already regulated in the domestic order or 
not.  In the first case, he will be forced to refer the question to the Constitutional 
Court, whilst in the second he will be entitled to apply the international norm in the 
trial before him. 
 
This material difference could lead to a veritable discriminatory treatment of 
similar situations, because the decisive criterion as to which procedure must be 
followed will be, in sum, the potential existence of a domestic regulation 
concerning the matter at stake.  Such a mechanism is likely to sort aleatory 
outcomes.  Moreover, there is the risk of giving the ordinary judge an excess of 
discretion as to whether, for instance, a domestic norm formulated in a general way 
is relevant (because it regulates the same situations of the international norm, 
although more generally) or not (because there is a domestic normative “vacuum” 
on the particular set of facts regulated by the international norm).82 
 
In sum, it looks like the old-fashioned interpretive scheme applies again in this 
case, or at least echoes in the Court’s words: (consistent) interpretation could be 
allowed even praeter legem, but it cannot be contra legem.  The prevalence scheme 
                                                                                                                
“[the Convention’s provisions] create rights and duties upon all subjects.”  For a list of similar decisions 
by the Supreme Court, see M. Pacini, Verso la disapplicazione delle disposizioni legislative contrarie alla Cedu?, 
13 GIORNALE DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 389 (2007).  In addition, see Commissione Tributaria regionale 
Lombardia of September 19, 2000, calling for “the direct application of ECvHR’s norms by 
administrative and jurisdictional [State] bodies.” 
82 O. Pollicino rightly stressed the risk of this discriminatory drift, in occasion of the STALS conference 
held at the Sant’Anna School of Legal Studies, Pisa, on February 25, 2008.  See how this concept is 
developed in his forthcoming article.  O. Pollicino, “The Italian Constitutional Court At the Crossroad 
Between Constitutional Parochialism and Cooperative Constitutionalism.”  Case note on judgments no. 348 and 
349 of 2007, 4 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2008).  In particular, he foresees a 
risk of discrimination due to the different application that ECvHR norms can have, “depending upon 
whether they apply only to domestic situations (in which case they have an intermediate level between 
ordinary statutes and constitutional law) or to situations of European law relevance (where, through 
their qualification as general principles of European law, they have a constitutional status).”  See for 
instance the decision of the Supreme Court (Criminal Section) dated February 6, 2003, where the 
Supreme Court, after stating that EC law has a direct effect which supersedes conflicting domestic law, 
apparently skips a middle step and directly ends up by saying that “the norm under Article 2, No. 2, of 
the Convention ... could not but find direct application.”  It seems that the Court here implicitly 
considers the conventional norm as forming part of the EC law.  Contra, see Supreme Court, Criminal III 
Section, decision No. 254 of January 12, 1999, where Article 5, No. 5 of the Convention was deemed to 
serve as a general guideline, and not to have a directly applicable content. 
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discolours and turns into a merely interpretive guideline whose criteria are more 
then well-known, and definitely not that revolutionary. 
 
It is important to keep record of ordinary judges’ reactions following the decisions 
commented, so as not to run the risk of losing touch with the facts.  In this view, it 
is important to note how the Court of Appeal of Florence, which in the past joined 
the crew of the “disapplying” judges, has recently conformed to the new directive 
issued by the Constitutional Court, lodging a constitutionality question in a case 
where disapplication could intervene as well.83 
 
G.  Bundesverfassungsgericht and the CoE System:  The Counter-Limits Theory 
in the October 14, 2004 Order.  Some Remarks on the Consistent Interpretation 
by the Judge 
 
As we stated above, the need for a constitutionality test on the Convention norm 
excludes the possibility of having a limited set of fundamental rights that could 
serve as a counter-limit; indeed, every norm of the Constitution shall be respected 
by the international norm challenged. 
 
Some of the referring judges, in fact, had offered the Court an alternative solution 
to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the domestic norm based on the counter-
limits mechanism.  In this respect we quote an excerpt of the order of referral No. 
401 of the Supreme Court dated May 20, 2006, that states as follows: 
 
[T]he direct effect in our legal order of legislative, 
administrative and judicial power of Community 
bodies is not such as to modify the constitutional 
structure of our legal system.  Some counter-limits 
to potential sovereignty limitations follow this 
constitutional structure: the Constitutional Court 
has identified, among others, the inalienable 
human rights, and the fundamental principles of 
our constitutional system.  Therefore, it could be 
maintained, in the light of the case-law of the 
Constitutional Court (and also of the case-law of 
                                            
83 As for expropriation for public purposes, see order No. 616 of 2007 of the Court of Appeal of Venice 
and order No. 780 of 2007 of the Court of Appeal of Florence.  As for unlawful expropriation, see order 
No. 712 of 2007 of the Court of Appeal of Naples, recently handed down by the Constitutional Court 
with the decision No. 66 of 2008, in which the Court, referring to the decision No. 349/2007, returned the 
constitutional question to the judge.  All these orders are based on the violation of the cited Article 117, 
para. 1. 
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the ECtHR), that the equalization of the 
compensation for expropriation to the market 
value of the land does not take into account the 
constitutional principle stating that property right 
withdraws, when faced to the primary value of the 
public interest. 84 
 
The parallel between the communitarian order and the CoE system is clearly 
sketched up here with the intention of legitimizing the potential use of the counter-
limits by the Constitutional judge.  In this scenario the social function of property, 
as pursuant to Article 42 of the Constitution, could be envisaged as a 
constitutionally indispensable principle, and could work as a limit to the adaptation 
of the domestic order to the rules of the ECvHR and to their interpretation given by 
the Strasbourg Court. 
 
This interpretation is not something absolutely original in the European 
framework,85 indeed the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG - German Federal 
Constitutional Court) had already proposed it in the order dated October 14, 2004.  
That decision, voted by unanimity, applied the well-known counter-limits theory – 
as developed in the Solange case-law – to the relationship between the German 
Constitution and the European Convention (and, more generally, international 
law). 
 
The first part of the decision, in which the ECvHR is equalized to any other 
statutory norm, gave rise to a diverse wave of criticism.  In fact, the BVerfG firstly 
assesses that in the German legal order the Convention, since it is given force by an 
ordinary federal statute, gets the same rank as the ordinary ratification norm.  
Therefore, ordinary judges are subject to the Convention, as pursuant to Article 20 
of the Constitution, just as they are to any other statutory norm: conventional rules 
cannot serve as the standard of review in a constitutionality trial.86 
 
The German Court, nevertheless, acknowledges the existence of an obligation 
bearing upon judges, i.e. the consistent interpretation of domestic law to 
international and supranational law.  However, this is not an absolute obligation, 
                                            
84 See Supreme Court, order May 20, 2006, No. 402, for a similar reasoning. 
85 For a comparative overview on this issue, see L. MONTANARI, I DIRITTI DELL’UOMO NELL’AREA EUROPEA 
TRA FONTI INTERNAZIONALI E FONTI INTERNE (2002); L. Montanari, La difficile definizione dei rapporti con la 
CEDU alla luce del nuovo art. 117, un confronto con Francia e Regno Unito, 10 DIR. PUB. COMP. EU. 204 (2008). 
86 See F. Müller and T. Richter, Report on the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s (Federal Constitutional Court) 
Jurisprudence in 2005/2006, 9 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 164 (2008). 
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since its performance is necessary only when the effort is methodically sustainable 
(methodisch vertretbar): in particular the BVerfG affirms that “this classification 
means that German Courts must observe and apply the Convention within the 
limits of methodically justifiable interpretation like other statute law of the Federal 
Government.”87  When it is not the case (that is, when no consistent interpretation 
can be provided), the judge must declare the reasons why he did not conform to the 
domestic norm, and these reasons will be subject to the BVerfG’s exam.  The latter 
can be consulted through an individual or incidental appeal, and plays the role of 
the “transmission chain connecting international and constitutional laws, and of the 
gatekeeper of Constitution’s primacy.”88 
 
Even though this picture does not seem to reveal a high degree of openness to 
international sources of law, including the European Convention, the order issued 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court is nevertheless of much interest, as it 
formulates the obligation of consistent interpretation, and the effects in the 
domestic order this obligation may imply. 
 
When no “adapting” interpretation is possible, there is an unsolvable conflict 
between the domestic source and the conventional one.  Such a conflict occurs 
when the statutory norm, as interpreted in the light of the ECvHR, counters the 
substance of a fundamental constitutional right: the statutory domestic norm – as 
construed following the Constitution’s directions – must then prevail on the 
international obligation.  
 
As in regard to this point we should mention the core theory put forward in the text 
of the decision:  the Court borrows from its well-established case-law the counter-
limits instrument, transplants it in the Constitution – ECvHR dialogue and limits its 
efficacy to a particular set of matters.  Counter-limits vis-à-vis the Convention, 
indeed, can function in a few occasions only, and the Court takes the effort to list 
                                            
87 See para. 32 of the decision. 
88 See. F. Palermo, Il Tribunale federale e la teoria selettiva del controlimiti, 25 QUAD. COST. 181 (2005). More 
specifically, if the judge does not take the ECvHR and its interpretation into account, a 
Verfassungbeschwerde can be lodged, challenging the domestic norm for violating the relevant 
fundamental right as set forth in the Constitution together with Article 20, para. 3.  For a detailed 
analysis of the decision under consideration, see also A. Di Martino, L’efficacia delle decisioni della Corte 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo nel diritto tedesco: il significato del Görgülu-Beschluβ per un tutela multilivello dei 
diritti, 8 DIR. PUB. COMP. EU. 911 (2006); A. Di Martino, L’efficacia delle sentenze della Corte EDU nel diritto 
interno: proposta per una soluzione interpretativa del contrasto tra giudicati alla luce di una pronuncia del 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, in ALL’INCROCIO TRA COSTITUZIONE E CEDU 99 (R. Bin, G. Brunelli, A. Pugiotto, 
P. Veronesi eds., 2007). 
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them: family law, foreigner law, and personality law.89  These fields, in the Court’s 
words, share a common feature because they “serve as indicators of the 
constitutional identity of the State.” 
 
Even if it is true, as many authors have stated, that these sectors are likely to 
expand almost uncontrollably upon other legal fields, we still have to appreciate 
the effort the German Court has made to limit the domestic law primacy to a few 
sectors, where a delicate balancing between constitutionally granted values has to 
intervene.  This choice would logically imply that in any other sector of law the 
conventional norm, as interpreted by the ECtHR, prevails. 90 
 
For these reasons, this decision could be the result of a veritable step forward 
towards a better coordination between orders, i.e. the (judicial) codification of a 
cooperation relationship between the National constitutional judge and the 
European judge.  Indeed, the Court protects the margin of discretion ordinary 
judges must enjoy when autonomously deciding a case, invites them to conform 
their rulings to the European case-law, and, at the same time, takes the charge of 
monitoring the application of the constitutional principle of 
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit, according to which domestic law must be interpreted so 
as to avoid the conflict with international law.91 
 
In the Italian legal order, the “constitutional resistance” to the influence of 
international law is not of a substantive (i.e. based on values) nature, but of a 
mechanical and hierarchical kind, thus, the obligation upon the judges to choose – 
where possible – the consistent interpretation bears a different meaning in the two 
systems. 
 
In Germany, national law is subject to two opposite pressures when confronted 
with the Convention: on one hand, consistent interpretation “stresses” the limits of 
national law to achieve a possible conciliation between the sources; on the other 
hand the “hard core principles” reassess the pre-eminence of the domestic order in 
                                            
89 As for the personality law, it is worth remembering the decision of the ECtHR of June 24, 2004, 
Hannover v. Germany, case No. 59320/00, in which the ECtHR’s interpretation of the extent of the right to 
privacy is different from the interpretation given by the BVerfG in a decision on the same case only a 
few months before.  
90 See. F. Palermo, supra note 88, at 184. 
91 See. L. Violini, L’indipendenza del giudice e il rispetto del diritto internazionale secondo una recente decisione 
del BVerfG: bilanciamento o prevalenza dei principi costituzionali nazionali?, 7 DIR. PUB. COMP. EUR. 1014 
(2005). 
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those areas where no cession of sovereignty to the international organizations has 
occurred, and intervenes in, presumably, exceptional cases. 
 
On the contrary, the pre-requisite of consistent interpretation in the Italian system92 
seems to represent a useless exercise when it manages to achieve consistency of the 
Italian norm solely with the Convention.  Indeed, the constitutionality test on the 
international norm is not occasional as it is in Germany, and must be carried out 
even when the “saving” interpretation of the judge has healed the relationship 
between the statutory norm and the international one.93  In other words, the judge 
should better check the constitutionality of the international norm before verifying 
the conventionality of the domestic norm; two tests should be done, and two 
distinct obligations of consistent interpretations bear on the judge.94 
 
Nevertheless, we would like to welcome the introduction in our system of an 
obligation, upon the ordinary judge, to conform his interpretation to the norms of 
international law.95  An analogue rationale can be found in the “Charming Betsy 
doctrine” formulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, according to 
which “An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations 
if any other possible construction remains.”96 
                                            
92 The technique of the consistent interpretation is a technique which the ordinary judge is obliged to 
apply before lodging a challenge of constitutionality before the Constitutional Court: before asking the 
Court’s intervention, indeed, the judge must try to find an interpretation according to which no conflict 
between the statutory norm and the Constitution can be envisaged.  In fact, there has been occasions 
where the duty to interpret the provision consistently with the Constitution was absolutely tied with the 
duty to carry out a Convention-consistent interpretation, see for instance decision No. 413 of 2004, where 
the Court states: “the Constitution-consistent interpretation is strengthened by some important norms, 
even of supra-national nature. [...] The ECvHR [...] provides the right for a just compensation for illegal 
detention, without any exception.”  See on this point B. Randazzo, La Convenzione Europea dei Diritti 
dell’Uomo nella giurisprudenza costituzionale, available at: www.cortecostituzionale.it, September 2007; B. 
Randazzo, Costituzione e Cedu: il giudice delle leggi apre una «finestra» su Strasburgo, 14 GIORNALE DI 
DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 25 (2008). 
93 We owe this sharp argument to N. Pignatelli, supra note 68. 
94 Not to mention the obligation to choose an interpretation of domestic norms that is consistent with EC 
law, see Advocate General Saggio’s Conclusions on joined cases from C-240 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo 
Editorial. 
95 This obligation was somehow implicit in some previous decisions of the Supreme Court, see for 
instances the set of decisions in which the Supreme Court reads Article 143 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code in the light of Article 6, par. 3, let. (a) of the Convention, thereby acknowledging the right of 
people charged with a criminal offence to be informed of their charges in a language they understand 
(see, among others, decisions December 23, 1987; December 18, 1992; April 26, 1999 and October 14, 
1999). 
96 See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 2 Cranch 64 (1804). 
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The principle enshrined in such a doctrine (and in the similar obligation the 
Constitutional Court imposes on Italian judges) is obviously a strong incentive to 
the harmonization of concurring case laws of different judicial bodies as regards 
similar issues; it goes without saying that in the field of human rights, where the 
sometimes overlapping jurisdictions of a number of tribunals seem to lack an 
effective normative coordination between themselves, such a judicial effort to 
preserve homogeneity is more than opportune. 
 
It is, nevertheless, curious how the forced coexistence of two rationales for the new 
reasoning (the formalistic and the axiological one, seen above) ends up creating a 
paradoxical situation in which the Convention must be interpreted consistently 
with the Constitution (as said, because of the need for constitutional control), whilst 
the Constitution itself, in its turn, must be interpreted consistently with the 
Convention.97  This uneasy result, once again, was obtained by mixing the 
traditional hermeneutic function of the Convention with its new subordinated 
position in the domestic legal order. 
 
H.  The Importance of the Strasbourg Court’s Case-Law in the Italian Legal 
System 
 
We would like to focus our analysis on another aspect of the Court’s reasoning that 
we have deliberately overlooked so far: the attention showed by the Court towards 
the Strasbourg Court’s case law.98 
 
                                            
97 See par. 6.1.1 of the 349 decision, which reads: “The interpretive role of the ECvHR has been 
acknowledged, with respect both to constitutional review standards and to challenged provisions (see 
decision No. 505 of 1995 and order No. 305 of 2001).”  On the interpretation consistent with Constitution 
and the integration between legal orders, see A. Guazzarotti and A. Cossiri, La CEDU nell’ordinamento 
italiano: la Corte costituzionale fissa le regole, available at: www.forumcostituzionale.it, 2008. 
98 As regards the importance of the single decisions of the Strasbourg Court, see for instance the 1226 
Resolution of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, dated September 2000.  In a passage of the 
text, it is stated that: “At national level: legislators should ensure that new legislation fully complies with 
the Convention; governments should take the necessary action to execute the Court’s judgments in order 
to avoid any recurrence of violations; governments should remedy the applicant’s individual situation 
and, where necessary, they should ensure that their legislation provides for the revision of a trial 
following a judgment of the Court; judges and administrators should work towards giving direct effect 
to the Court’s judgments so that national court authorities can directly apply them; national authorities 
should make sure that the Court’s case-law is adequately circulated in the language(s) of the country; 
until definitive reforms come into effect, domestic authorities and courts should adopt interim 
measures.”  It is not the case that the parties of the trial before the referring judge stressed the 
importance of this resolution, and included it in the brief to the Constitutional Court. 
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Indeed, the Constitutional Court regularly refers to the norms of the European 
Convention “as interpreted by the ECtHR.”  This is a clear example of how the 
Court intentionally neglects a positivistic approach to international law, and adopts 
instead a dynamic understanding of the Convention:  the standard of review for 
challenging the constitutionality of an Italian act is not the norm of the Convention 
in itself, but the norm as construed by the judicial body charged with its 
interpretation and adjudication. 
 
It is worthy here to quote an excerpt of the No. 348 decision: 
 
Since legal norms live in the interpretation that 
legal professionals give to them, in particular 
judges, the obvious consequence of Article 32, 
paragraph 1, of the European Convention is that 
among the international obligations Italy entered 
into by executing and ratifying the ECvHR there is 
the obligation to adapt its domestic legislation to 
the provisions of this treaty, as interpreted by the 
[European] Court, which has been introduced 
specifically to perform their interpretation and 
application.99 
 
The Constitutional Court underlines this meeting of interests, when it states that its 
role is different from the role of the Strasbourg Court, but that their common 
purpose is to protect fundamental human rights to the best extent possible.  This 
referral to the best protection seems to imply the willingness to sacrifice, if it is the 
case, the domestic solution when the solution offered or supported in Strasbourg 
seems to achieve better results. 
 
Whereas this broadminded reading of the international norm (which does not 
consist in the mere provision codifying it) is certainly opportune when dealing with 
the CoE system, it could give rise to some doubts if applied to other international 
law orders.  We should bear in mind, in fact, that the Court takes avail of this 
double-decision and of the ECvHR example to specify the role of any international 
treaty norm in the Italian order. 
 
Accordingly, the reasoning the Court used with the Convention should work with 
provisions of other international law systems as well, which could lack an organ of 
“central” adjudication, a body to whom the Court could address to verify the 
                                            
99 See decision No. 348, para. 4.6. 
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official and authentic interpretation of the norm at stake.  Let’s not forget that the 
international law system, traditionally, foresees a situation where States bind 
themselves to the terms of an agreed treaty and, unless otherwise specified in its 
text, they severally play as official interpreters of such a set of norms.100  More 
generally, not every treaty provides for a monitoring or judicial body, thus, it could 
often be difficult for the Court to spot the “official” interpretation of an 
international law provision.101 
 
Apart from the problem concerning international legal orders deprived of an 
“authoritative interpreter,” the extension of the model drawn by the Court with 
regard to the ECvHR system to other international treaties could arouse another 
main cause of concern.  In the Italian constitutional order, the Government is 
enabled to conclude international agreements in a simplified way (accordi in forma 
semplificata), therefore there is no need for further ratification by the Parliament if 
the parties to the treaty have agreed that the States are bound upon the sole 
signature of the treaty, as pursuant to Article 12 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. 
 
We would, then, have a situation where a source adopted without the control of the 
Parliament (the international simplified agreement) would supersede a domestic 
norm of ordinary rank.  There is no need to add any further consideration to 
understand how unfeasible this solution is.  We think that this evident problem 
could be prevented if we carefully examine the content of Article 117, paragraph 1, 
of the Constitution, and we agree with those scholars102 who maintain that 
international, simplified agreements do not fall within the scope of application of 
the constitutional provision due to their lack of democratic justification. 
 
                                            
100 This is the case, for instance, of the United Nations Charter. 
101 This question is likely to surface with regard to the ILO Convention.  Indeed the labour judge of the 
Tribunal of Brescia has lodged a constitutionality question (order of January 15, 2007) in which he 
challenges the constitutionality of some Italian statutory provisions, referring to Article 117, paragraph 
1, of the Constitution, for violating the No. 97 of 1949 and the No. 143 of 1975 ILO Conventions. The 
question is now pending.  We must recall that the ILO Conventions had already been invoked in 
connection with Article 10 and Article 117, para. 1, of the Constitution (in particular both the ILO 
Conventions No. 97/1949 and No. 158/1981) in front of the Italian Constitutional Court.  However, The 
Court, in the decision No. 324/2006, considered the question inadmissible because the judge would have 
been able to resolve the question by interpreting the norm consistently with the Constitution. 
102 See L. Bartolomei, La garanzia costituzionale dei trattati alla luce della legge 5 giugno 2003, n. 231 contenente 
disposizioni per l’adeguamento alla legge costituzionale 18 ottobre 2001, XX Rivista di diritto internazionale 
privato e processuale 853 (2003); P. Cavaleri, Articolo 1, in L’ATTUAZIONE DEL NUOVO TITOLO V, COMMENTO 
ALLA LEGGE “LA LOGGIA” 6 (P. Cavaleri and E. Lamarque eds., 2003).  
2008]                                                                                                       923The European Convention in the Italian Legal System.
Indeed, L. Elia, former president of the Constitutional Court, when asked by the 
Parliament to illustrate the meaning of the amended Article 117, paragraph 1, 
mentioned the possibility that, due to the increased influence all treaties could 
have, the Parliament could be called to exercise a more rigid control over the 
Government’s external action, “and to be more alert and demanding when 
conceding the Government the authorization to ratify a treaty, following the 
example of Senate of the United States.”103   
 
I.  Degree of Protection and Lack of Protection of a Right:  Hypotheses Conflict 
Between the Italian Framework of Safeguard of Fundamental Rights and the 
Council of Europe System 
 
As for the possible conflicts that are more likely to occur between the Italian 
framework of the safeguard of fundamental rights and the CoE system, we can 
conceive a case of difference on the degree of protection of one right granted by the 
two systems, as it was been in the case under consideration.104  In similar cases, a 
settlement could be most likely to originate from an interpretive effort, as the 
Italian Constitutional Court itself recognized, when it affirmed that: “from the 
jurisprudential trend held by this Court in the past it is possible to infer – in 
principle – an acknowledgment of the particular relevance of the Convention’s 
provisions, due to its content.  This relevance requires an effort, especially on the 
interpretative level, to grant a basic sameness and integration between the 
guarantees set by the European Convention of Human Rights and by the 
Constitution, that the legislator must respect and execute.” 105 
 
In this sense, it is easier to understand why the Court intended to introduce the 
need for a “balancing moment” in its review of conventional law:  the mere 
compatibility with the Constitution is often obvious, as both charters are designed 
to protect the same rights.  As for the intensity of the protection, instead, the Court 
could intervene and disregard the higher standard set by the ECtHR, claiming that 
the need for protecting another concurring constitutional right had forced the Court 
to choose a compromise, partially sacrificing both rights.  This is the option that the 
Court could have preferred in deciding the No. 348 and 349 cases, if it had held that 
the social function of property right bore such a material relevance that it justified 
                                            
103 See the report of the Senate session dated March 8, 2001.  On this point see also, F. Ghera, Una svolta 
storica nei rapporti del diritto interno con il diritto internazionale pattizio (ma non con quelli con il diritto 
comunitario), 133 FORO ITALIANO 52 (2008). 
104 See for instance the conception of privacy that the ECtHR uses in the Hannover v. Germany case, cited 
above, and how it differs from the same concept developed by the German Constitutional Court. 
105 See decision No. 349, para. 6.1.2. 
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the otherwise unlawful violation of property right as represented by a partial 
compensation. 
 
However, is it possible that a conflict could be envisaged not solely in connection 
with the degree of protection, but also with the lack of protection of a fundamental 
right.  An example is represented by the decision Dorigo v. Italy, in which the 
European Commission of Human Rights condemned Italy for violation of Article 6, 
para. 3, let. d), of the ECvHR, because the criminal trial did not respect the right of 
the defendant “to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him,” a right needed to ensure due process 
conditions.106   
 
In particular, Article 630, let. a), of the Italian criminal procedure code provides an 
exhaustive list of the cases that can legitimate a party to ask for the review of a 
sentence having obtained the force of res judicata, but the list does not include the 
conflict between the final sentence and a decision of the ECtHR on the same facts.   
 
The decision of the European Commission, however, could not entitle the 
summoned judge to review the national decision, because Article 630 list is 
complete, and cannot be integrated.  Therefore, the judge lodged a question of 
constitutionality before the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality 
of that provision under Article 3, 10, para.1, and 27 of the Italian Constitution.  In 
fact, he did not use the Article 117, paragraph 1 to invoke the violation of Article 6 
of the ECvHR but he proposed, in the referral, the direct application of Article 46 of 
the Convention (which sanctions the effectiveness of the decisions of the Strasbourg 
Court) and the review of the process, as a consequence of the direct application of 
Article 6.107 
 
The Supreme Court, in the meantime, had already shown some relevant signs of 
openness to the ECvHR system, also bearing in mind the continuous solicitations 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which since 1999 had been 
asking Italy to adopt the necessary measures to reopen any trial ended with an 
unfair condemnation.108 
                                            
106 See Commission, Dorigo v. Italy, September 9, 1998. In particular, Mr. Dorigo was condemned on the 
basis of some witnesses’ declarations that were not confirmed during the judicial debate. 
107 See Court of Appeal, Bologna, order No. 337 of March 15, 2006 (Dorigo case). 
108 See on this point A. Guazzarotti, Il caso Dorigo: una piccola rivoluzione nei rapporti tra CEDU e 
ordinamento interno?, 25 QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA 149 (2007); R. Conti, La Corte dei diritti dell’uomo e la 
Convenzione europea prevalgono sul giudicato – e sul diritto – nazionale, 24 CORRIERE GIURIDICO 689 (2007). 
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In the Somogy case,109 indeed, the Supreme Court decided to re-open the process, in 
accordance with the ECtHR’s ruling,110 by using the mechanism of the reopening of 
terms (restituzione nel termine) in the case of a process celebrated in absentia.111  
Also, in regard to the incarceration of Mr. Dorigo, the Supreme Court had already 
stated that the judge of the execution must declare the impracticability of the 
incarceration under Article 670 of the Criminal Procedure Code,112 once that was 
accomplished that the ECtHR found that the condemnation was inflicted in 
violation of Article 6 of the ECvHR.113 
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court tried to find an internal instrument to reopen a 
process celebrated in violation of the ECvHR, with an operation that seems to be 
halfway between the direct application of the cited Article 6 of the Convention and 
the consistent interpretation of Article 670 of the Criminal Procedure Code with the 
ECvHR norm, as resulting from the jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg. 
 
For the sake of completeness, we mention here the Cat Berro case (even though it 
concerns the issue of reopening a trial - concluded with a condemnation in default 
of appearance - that the ECtHR had declared in violation of Article 6, rather that the 
right to examine witnesses).  Here the Supreme Court disregarded the rationale of 
the quasi-contemporaneous Dorigo case, stating that the solution to redress the 
conflict with the European charter is not to be found under Article 670 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, but in the application of the reopening of terms (under 
Article 175 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as in the Somogy case).114 
 
Recently, with order No. 129/2008,115 the Court issued its decision on the Dorigo 
case adopting an order whereby it rejected the question of constitutionality as 
                                            
109 See Supreme Court, I Criminal Section, July 12 – October 3, 2006, No. 32678. 
110 See ECtHR, Somogy v. Italy, No. 67972/01. 
111See Art 175 of the Italian criminal procedure Code, which in the meanwhile had been amended by the 
legislator. 
112 Which regulates the mechanism of the incarceration’s suspension (sospensione dell’esecuzione). 
113 See Supreme Court, I Criminal Section, decision January 5, 2007, No. 2800. 
114 On the mechanisms used by the Supreme Court in Somogy, Dorigo and Cat Berro case to reopen the 
process and the possible internal solutions, see A. Pugiotto, Vent’anni dopo l’insegnamento di Giovanni 
Battaglini, in ALL’INCROCIO 191 (R. Bin, G. Brunelli, A. Pugiotto, P. Veronesi eds., 2007); and A. Filippini, 
Il caso Dorigo, La CEDU e la Corte costituzionale: l'effettività della tutela dei diritti dopo le sentenze 348 e 349 del 
2007, available at:  www.costituzionalismo.it. 
115 Dated April, 30, 2008. 
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groundless, as regarding the standards invoked (Article 3, 10, para. 1, and 27 of the 
Italian Constitution, Article 117, para. 1 was not proposed).  The Court, thereby, 
confirmed the view adopted in the No. 348 and 349 decisions, and refused the 
possibility of invoking the European Convention by using Article 10 of the 
Constitution.116 
 
The Court argued that it could not integrate the list of Article 630 by means of 
declaration of unconstitutionality; such integration, in fact, would amount to a law 
making activity that the Court is not entitled to perform.  It would be up to the 
legislator, instead, to fine-tune the relevant regulation, and to provide for the most 
opportune modalities of reopening of the trial.117  In any event, this decision 
allowed the Court to address an urgent request (pressante invito) to the legislator, to 
amend as soon as possible the domestic provisions in accordance with the 
directions of the jurisprudence by the Court of Strasbourg.118 
 
It is worthy to note how the Court decided to confirm its views in the No. 39 
decision of 2008, dated February 27, 2008, as well.  It declared the 
unconstitutionality of two provisions of the Italian Former Bankruptcy Law119 of 
1942 under two standards of review: Article 3 and Article 117, paragraph 1, of the 
Constitution, as integrated by Article 8, paragraph 2, of the ECvHR, in the 
interpretation given in its recent decisions by the Strasbourg Court.120   
 
In this case, it is interesting to point out, how the Court craved rehearsing the 
reasoning of the No. 348 and 349 decisions, with the vision to strengthen and 
reaffirm its value, in particular as concerns ECtHR’s case-law, “whereby Member 
States are bound to abide, except for the constitutionality test.”121  The Italian Court 
referred back to some decisions of the Strasbourg Court, with an eye to define the 
                                            
116 See § 4.2 of the Dorigo decision. 
117 On this, see A. Cisterna, La rimozione della detenzione iniqua è l’unico rimedio congruo e praticabile, 15 
(Issue 20) GUIDA AL DIRITTO 67 2008); V. Sciarabba, Il problema dell’intangibilità del giudicato tra Corte di 
Strasburgo, giudici comuni, Corte costituzionale e… legislatore?, available at: www.forumcostituzionale.it. 
118 This request represents an example of a typical species of decision that the Court can adopt, classified 
by the Italian scholarship with the expression of ‘warning decisions’ (sentenze monito). On this 
classification see E. Malfatti, S. Panizza, R. Romboli, GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE 141 (2003); R. Romboli, Il 
giudizio di costituzionalità delle leggi in via incidentale, in AGGIORNAMENTI IN TEMA DI PROCESSO 
COSTITUZIONALE (2002-2004) 127 (R. Romboli ed., 2005).  
119 Namely Article 50 and 142 of the Royal Decree No. 267 of 1942, in the text preceding the 2006 reform. 
120 In particular, see Vitiello v. Italia, No. 77962/01. 
121 See § 5 of the decision. 
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wide notion of “private life” as referred to in Article 8 of the Convention, that “does 
not exclude, in principle, professional or business activities, given that in the 
business environment, indeed, people establish numerous relations with the 
external sphere,” and that leads the Constitutional Court to declare the 
unconstitutionality of the challenged provision.122 
 
J.  The Historical Perspective of the Decisions Under Consideration:  The Parallel 
With the EC Legal Order 
 
In conclusion, we deem it necessary to draw a parallel between the content of the 
decisions commented on and the process that took place in the 1960s and in the 
1970s in regard to the EC law.  Indeed, when the debate about the role of EC law in 
the Italian legal order arose, the Constitutional Court took a position that was quite 
similar to its current one regarding international treaty law, and explained its view 
in the very same terms used in the No. 348 and 349 decisions.123 
 
In its decision No. 232 of 1975 the Court excluded “disapplication as the result of 
the possibility, left to the Italian judge, to choose between the EC norm and the 
domestic norm on the basis of a discretionary evaluation of their respective force.”  
In another passage of the same decision, the Court stated that “the judge, when 
facing the situation following the adoption of Italian norms implementing 
Community regulations bearing a direct effect, must pledge the question of their 
constitutionality.” 
 
                                            
122 According to some authors, in this decision the Constitutional Court seems to enlarge its mandate to 
monitor the consistency between national law and international obligations, asserting its right to 
intervene even to rule the conflict between international law and a previous domestic statutory norm 
(rectius: a domestic norm adopted prior to the domestic law implementing the international norm). In 
these cases, indeed, it would go without saying, under the lex posterior principle, that the domestic norm 
would be implicitly invalidated, without the need for a constitutionality test.  Others maintain that the 
vague wording of Article 8 of the Convention could not trigger a strict lex posterior mechanism; hence 
this decision rather reflects the decisive importance lying in the Strasbourg case-law.  For an extensive 
analysis of this issue, see V. Sciarabba, Il problema dei rapporti tra (leggi di esecuzione di) vincoli 
internazionali e leggi precedenti nel quadro della recente giurisprudenza costituzionale (a margine della sentenza 
della Corte costituzionale n. 39 del 2008), available at:  www.forumcostituzionale.it; R. Mastroianni, La 
sentenza della Corte cost. n. 39 del 2008 in tema di rapporti tra leggi ordinarie e CEDU: anche le leggi 
cronologicamente precedenti vanno rimosse dalla Corte costituzionale?, available at: 
www.forumcostituzionale.it (the Author rightly notes that this position adopted by the Constitutional 
Court will probably lead to an increase of its workload). 
123 For a careful description of the dynamics between national, constitutional and conventional law, see 
R. Cafari Panico and L. Tomasi, Il futuro della CEDU tra giurisprudenza costituzionale e diritto dell’Unione, 
10 DIR. PUB. COMP. EU. 186 (2008). 
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It is very easy to recognize in this thought pattern the same reasoning of the 2007 
decisions.  Whilst it was fully understandable that the Italian constitutional order 
had to open to the entry of EC law gradually, back when the EC order was 
dawning, it is less reasonable to adopt this very cautious approach now.  The 
system set forth by the Council of Europe, has existed for half a century, and its 
action is surrounded by a general consensus that clashes with the meticulous 
control test built by the Constitutional Court.  The field of human rights, moreover, 
is probably the only one where States can limit (integrate?) their own sovereign 
power entrusting competences to a supra-national body without fear of having 
their authoritativeness, or their State identity, decreased.124 
 
This to say that these decisions, besides being mostly motivated under the technical 
aspect, look a little old fashioned, like echoing the starting chapter of a story for 
which we already know the epilogue. 
 
As we know, the European Court of Justice125 set the ultimate standard regarding 
the direct effect of EC law and its supremacy over conflicting national law, and the 
Constitutional Court could not but accept this interpretation, and reaffirm it in 
Decision No. 170 of 1984.126  After that, there was no doubt that the ordinary judge 
was not only entitled, but even requested to disapply the internal conflicting 
provisions, and to give application to the relevant EC norm. 
 
After 1984, the ordinary judge was to some extent compensated for the forced 
deprivation of part of its discretionary power (consequent to the automatic 
prevalence of community law on domestic law), with a new competence; the 
judged cannot choose which law to apply (EC law must always be preferred), but at 
least he bears the power to disapply the internal source and to apply the EC norm.  
On the contrary, the ordinary judge that identifies a conflict between the Italian 
norm and the Convention, and that verifies that no possible consistent 
interpretation could be found, has no alternative but to lodge the constitutionality 
question to the Constitutional Court; the (apparently) unconditional prevalence of 
the international norm on the statutory source cannot be handled by the ordinary 
                                            
124 See decision No. 388 of 1999: “Besides the sameness [of human rights provisions] in the charters that 
regulate their protection, the different formulations implementing them can integrate between 
themselves, and complete each other in at the interpretation stage.”  
125 See case 35/76, Simmenthal SpA v. Italian Minister for Finance [1976] ECR 1871; [1977] 2 CMLR 1. 
126 See Granital v. Italian Minister for Finance, No. 170/84, June 8, 1984. 
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judge, whose role is only to refer to the Constitutional Court.127  To prevent this 
drain of competence the judge could be tempted to abuse the consistent 
interpretation, so as to avoid referring the case to the Constitutional Court.128 
 
In particular, it is manifest that the very same peculiarity that induces the Court to 
acknowledge the monopoly of interpretation of ECvHR upon the ECtHR, in its role 
of authentic interpreter, is the same one that led the Court in the past to 
acknowledge the possibility, regarding the EC law, of the direct disapplication of 
the domestic conflicting norm.  Indeed, the role of an authentic interpreter played 
by the European Court of Justice correctly ended up causing the exclusion of the 
constitutional control on EC law, whereas in the No. 348 and 349 decisions the 
acknowledgment of the binding force of the ECtHR’s case law is still accompanied 
by the need for the Constitutional Court’s interpretive interference.129 
 
Apart from the abovementioned considerations on the opportunity of the 
constitutional control exercised by the Court on the Convention, we just mention 
here to risk, perceived also as in regard to other European jurisdictions, that the 
Italian Constitutional Court, once subject both to the EC primacy and the 
international treaty law precedence, would end up by having its competence 
shrunk to the “internal side” of the Italian normative production, that is, the Court 
would be de facto declassed to the rank of “regional” court.130  It is worthy here to 
recall the sharp conclusion of M. Cartabia, who notes how “the outcome of this 
double trend [that of enlarging the competence of the central European Tribunals, 
while at the same time entrusting ordinary judges with new tasks], that fosters at 
once centralisation and spreading, could be the marginalization of the 
Constitutional Court.”131 
 
                                            
127 See M. Luciani, Alcuni interrogativi sul nuovo corso della giurisprudenza costituzionale in ordine ai rapporti 
fra diritto italiano e diritto internazionale, 25 CORRIERE GIURIDICO 204 (2008); R. Conti, supre note 71, at 213 
(underlining the lack of a mechanism like Article 234 TCE in the ECHR system). 
128 For a careful evaluation of the role of the ordinary judge according to the instructions of the decisions 
commented here, see A. Bultrini, Le sentenze 348 e 349/2007 della Corte costituzionale: l’inizio di una svolta?, 
XXV DIR. PUB. COMP. EU. 171 (2008). 
129 See the decision No. 10 of 1993, then disregarded by the subsequent case law, which tried to concede 
Italian norms implementing the ECvHR an atypical force, higher than the ordinary force of statutory 
law. 
130 As sharply argued by M. Luciani, supra note 127, at 205. 
131 M. Cartabia, La Costituzione italiana e l’universalità dei diritti umani, available at: http://www.astrid-
online.it/rassegna/30-04-2008/Cartabia_-Lincei_-10_1_2008---def.pdf, 8. 
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The present interpretation, however, gives rise to other systemic doubts.  
Acknowledging the primacy of EC law over domestic law whilst refusing a similar 
peculiarity to the Convention can be a non-convincing solution given that the 
Convention in turn could prevail on the EC law due to its fundamental nature.132 
 
K.  Conclusions  
 
In light of the considerations made so far, it is worthwhile to now propose a few 
final thoughts that could help us to understand the potential impact these decisions 
could have in the near future. 
 
The Constitutional Court decided to support the openness of the Italian legal 
system to the international law universe, but it seemed to do so using a strictly 
domestic device, such as the introduction of a middle step in the source hierarchy, 
as we have been trying to explain.  This attempt reflected the complexity of the 
decisions’ reasoning, and underlined how a definitive choice between the 
formalistic approach and the axiological one has not been made yet. 
 
The Court took avail of these decisions to finally clarify the real meaning of Article 
117, par. 1 of the Constitution, and therefore carved out a decision which would 
work as a model for the future dynamics of the relationship between national (both 
regional and State) and supra-national norms, and as a memorandum for the 
Courts involved in the management of such normative network, each at the 
relevant level.  The willingness of establishing general rules ended up losing touch 
with the case at stake:  it could be argued that the ECvHR deserved a different 
treatment from the other sources of international law; both because of its very 
nature, and because of the unique features of the judicial system it is attached to 
(most of all, the enforceability of the ECtHR’s rulings). 
 
The Court certainly decided to intervene steadily in order to contain the 
disapplication wave that had already started spreading among the Italian Courts, 
and, at the same time, it took avail of this opportunity to invent a new task for 
itself, that of superintending the efficacy of international law in the Italian legal 
order.  This choice came at a price: not only did it mean a sudden stop to the merit 
judges that had started behaving more properly like natural judges of the 
Convention, but it could more generally weigh down the circulation of human 
rights across the systems.  On the other hand, the Court acknowledged the absolute 
importance of the (potentially evolutionary) interpretation of the Strasbourg Court, 
                                            
132 See R. Conti, supra note 71, at 211. 
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thus opening the way to an enriching dialogue between jurisdictions, from whose 
effects the overall level of protection of rights could probably benefit. 
 
The Court is currently handling the ILO case (see above), and it will represent a 
good chance to verify which of the different souls of the commented decisions will 
prevail.  Indeed, we will be able to see, respectively, the Court’s position with 
respect to the potential prevalence of the internal provision on the conventional 
rule, and which criterion the Court will follow to identify the authoritative 
interpretation of an international source that has no official interpreter. 
 
Moreover, another challenge will probably come “from the above:” the EU 
membership to the Convention will soon become reality, and it is difficult now to 
foresee what its effect shall be, apart from the almost peaceful consideration that 
the Convention will only have some influence the EU – related competences.  In 
any case, the attempt made by the Court to limit the influence of the Convention to 
matters of EU law could not resist the harmonising momentum, which is gradually 
leading to the “merger” of the European charters of rights. 
 
From a technical point of view, the introduction of constitutionality test run by a 
judicial body on the content of the Convention seems a slightly anachronistic move, 
and not fully justified.  In fact, it seems like the enlargement of supra-national law 
forces domestic Courts to rule an area of absolute judicial exclusiveness that keeps 
constantly lessening.  It is unlikely that the Court could be actually afraid to become 
a “regional” tribunal, but still it has to be careful if it wants to preserve and execute 
its powers, however, this constant re-definition of tasks could sometimes seem to 
endanger the role of the ordinary judge,133 especially when it consists of a 
centralization of tasks, rather than a partition of duties ruled by some principle of 
judicial subsidiarity. 
 
In the end, the technical asperities of these decisions will be softened through the 
constant practical applications of the principles contained therein, and the utmost 
effort played by the Italian Constitutional Court to open the Italian legal order to 
the case-law of the ECtHR (that is, the overcoming of a formalistic understanding of 
the Convention) is a decisive step towards the definite abandonment of the counter-
limits rhetoric at least if, as we assume, the proclaimed possibility to “review” the 
Convention will remain dead letter. 
                                            
133 The choice made in the decision No. 39/2008 mentioned above could give rise to similar doubt.  The 
Court therein seemed to prevent ordinary judges from taking the initiative and from taking possession 
of the "conventionality test" too early; in fact, the Constitutional Court gave the good example, showing 
how a careful understanding of the Strasbourg jurisprudence can facilitate the prevalence of the 
Convention on the domestic provisions. 
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